Dne 1.6.2016 v 18:18 Ben Rosser napsal(a):
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 10:58 AM, Matthias Clasen <mcla...@redhat.com
> <mailto:mcla...@redhat.com>> wrote:
>
>     On Wed, 2016-06-01 at 09:59 -0400, Matthew Miller wrote:
>
>     >
>     > This paints a very specific premise of what a "logout" is, and I'm
>     > not
>     > sure I agree with it. There are actually many cases where I want to
>     > use
>     > resources on systems I have accounts on without specifically being
>     > logged in — the login session is just a connection in to manage
>     > things.
>     >
>     > Otherwise, we should remove user crontabs, at, and similar.  And
>     > there
>     > are definitely some systems where that policy has a place, but I
>     > don't
>     > see it making sense as Fedora default, either system wide or for any
>     > of
>     > the Editions.
>     >
>
>     Explicitly marking things to escape the session (nohup, crontab,
>     starting system services, etc) is very different from just leaking any
>     and all non-terminating processes out of the session.
>
>     I am very much in favor of systemd enforcing that the session actually
>     ends when I log out, so that I don't accidentally leave processes
>     running. Leaking session processes have been a perennial problem that
>     we have been battling forever (gconf, ibus, pulseaudio, the list goes
>     on...). And they are causing actual problems, from preventing re-login
>     to subtly breaking the next session to slowing down shutdown.
>
>     That doesn't mean that you can't have user crontabs. As Lennart says,
>     using those mechanisms should ideally be a privileged operation
>     (with a
>     lenient policy on single-user systems).
>
>
>     Matthias
>     --
>
>
> Why should the policy only be lenient on single-user systems?
>
> Even if I accept for the moment that letting a user keep processes
> running on a system when they log out should be considered
> "privileged", this is a privilege that has more or less always been
> granted to users by default. Why do we suddenly need to change the
> default?

I'd say that the privilege was granted by accident not by design and
this should change now, since systemd introduces infrastructure to fix
this. I consider this reasonable, although it apparently breaks some
forkflows. As long as there is way to change the defaults for
experienced users, I welcome such change. I dare to say that this is
good feature for majority of Fedora users although from the discussion
of experienced users on this list it might seem to break the whole world.


Vít


>
> Sure, providing functionality to *remove* that privilege from a user
> as necessary is a nice feature. But I would strongly be opposed to the
> distribution suddenly changing the status quo here without good reason.
>
> Ben Rosser
>
>
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