On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 2:22 PM Przemek Klosowski via devel <devel@lists.fedoraproject.org> wrote: >I think Fedora should optimize > for laptops/desktops, so if we had to chose one default I would vote for > sleep, or shutdown if sleep was not available.
The default could be predicated on systemd chassis attribute. > but it's less secure---the decryption password hashes (**) have to be > present on the media. Bitlocker in TPM mode has the secrets locked in > the TPM, and as an added benefit uses the 'enterprise' authorization > scheme, with revocation, recovery keys, single logon (no separate > decryption and login credentials), etc. You wrote that bitlocker > 'configured properly ... simply shows a prompt forever', but I think > that the current best practice is to use TPM, in which case the system > proceeds to the login prompt, and the full decryption is only done after > user authentication. I think that's how FileVault in MacOS works, and > perhaps Linux is also heading this way. Filevault 1 was disk image based. Filevault 2 is either Core Storage or APFS based, they didn't change the name. I'm loose on the details, but my vague understanding with Core Storage is method of unlocking the encrypted LV (they had something functionally like dmcrypt, but it was an attribute of the volume, Logical Volume Families, and managed by the logical volume manager, i.e. Core Storage) was done by the bootloader. That entire interface for user selection and entering your passphrase, I'm pretty sure was all before any XNU boot had taken place; macOS has a kernel extentions cache file but not an initramfs like thing. The difficulty on Linux with this approach, as I understand it, really is getting all the possible input types, hardware and languages, supported in either the bootloader or in the initramfs. And the trend has been making pre-boot and initramfs environments less complicated. Filevault 2 when APFS is used, I haven't investigated how it works even generally, but I know APFS makes it cheap to create Volumes that share a file system pool, and volumes can be encrypted or not. So they could plausibly do a minimalist boot to a login window using files in an unencrypted volume, and from there unlock the main volume and switch root. I see on my own mac with APFS that there is an unencrypted boot volume and an encrypted main volume where the bulk of the OS, apps, and user data is located; but APFS also supports single key and multi key encryption, and also per volume and per file encryption. Anyway, the Fedora Workstation working group has this as an issue being explored by a subgroup very soon, and make recommendations back to the working group. So there will be a lot more discussion about this in the near future. https://pagure.io/fedora-workstation/issue/82 https://meetbot.fedoraproject.org/fedora-meeting-2/2019-08-19/workstation.2019-08-19-13.01.html -- Chris Murphy _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
