On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 01:54:59PM +0200, Jiri Denemark wrote: > On Tue, Jun 25, 2024 at 11:48:45 +0200, Michal Privoznik wrote: > > This is a promised follow up to: > > > > https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/7QQXVQXZATOIDYAJFOT45RPXRKX4GEWP/ > > > > Michal Prívozník (8): > > libvirt_private.syms: Export virDomainLaunchSecurity enum handlers > > qemuxmlconftest; Explicitly enable QEMU_CAPS_SEV_SNP_GUEST for > > "launch-security-sev-snp" > > qemu_capabilities: Probe SEV capabilities even for > > QEMU_CAPS_SEV_SNP_GUEST > > domcaps: Report launchSecurity > > qemu: Fill launchSecurity in domaincaps > > qemu_validate: Use domaincaps to validate supported launchSecurity > > type > > virt-host-validate: Move AMD SEV into a separate func > > virt-host-validate: Detect SEV-ES and SEV-SNP > > Overall it looks OK (see replies to 3/8 and 5/8 for a few nits) and it > makes sense to me. But you should probably wait for a second look from > someone familiar with SEV to check the design makes sense. > > Reviewed-by: Jiri Denemark <[email protected]>
Looks fine to me. Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
