On Monday 21 July 2008 13:11, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > - Limit any single node to no more than 20% of our outgoing requests, show > > this figure on the connections page; for darknet only nodes with <10 peers, a > > higher limit may be necessary, we may want to not send requests and warn the > > user with an option to override if we have too few functional peers for basic > > anonymity. > > How about limiting each peer to 2/n requests if we have n peers? (Or > 3/n, or whatever.) It could be a hard limit, or we could just back off > from any peer that's accepted more than 2/n of the last 1000 accepted > requests.
I'm not sure that this would solve the problem though. A hostile node could probably get most of the keyspace, and therefore most of the local requests, without interfering with the target's specialisation, which is where most of its remote requests come in...? > > Cheers, > Michael
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