On Wednesday 02 Jan 2013 18:54:45 Matthew Toseland wrote: > On Friday 28 Dec 2012 13:34:26 Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: > > Am Montag, 24. Dezember 2012, 21:11:55 schrieb Robert Hailey: > > > With that being said, the scarce resource (in theory) would be location > > > (detectable by network address), because an attacker simulating many nodes > > > would likely have them in a very confined space (like a server closet or a > > > few buildings here-and-there), and could not spoof a wildly different > > > location because it would interfere with routing. > > > > Except if he just bought some time on one of the million-computer botnets > > for > > doing the attack. > > Yes, I'm putting that sort of thing in the "expensive attacks" box. > > > > But aside that: If we can marry your idea with transport plugins, that > > might > > be an option to create scarcity at least for some transports. Freenet could > > then prefer scarce transports over abundant transports - if available. > > Maybe. > > Even without rewiring the internet, we have several resources we can use that > provide at least some level of scarcity that we can maybe throttle by: > - CAPTCHAs > - IP addresses > - ASN lookup of IP addresses. > I have lots of detailed ideas on this, will post shortly when I can get them together in a usable form. The limiting factor is it's hard to distinguish between "attacker creates 5000 nodes on a single AS" versus "slashdot causes lots of newbies on a single AS". We can still improve a lot on the status quo though.
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