On 07/30/2013 02:58 PM, Robert Hailey wrote: > > On 2013/07/30 (Jul), at 1:21 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote: > >> Too long? Too honest? IMHO we need to err on the side of honesty. > > IMO it is missing a few Tor downers.
Good points. > (1) people can & have run "exit nodes" to collect passwords Could be framed as "attacks on unencrypted connections are still easy." Is it valid to say that in general usage getting someone to proxy through your machine (to abuse their connection) is more difficult than getting them to use your Tor exit node? > (2) Tor generally uses only 3 hops (e.g. easier Sybil & traffic analysis) Is correlation between activity on the same circuit also relevant? > (3) people can & have been busted using Tor-hosted services Would it be appropriate to link to the "Hidden Services need some love" post for more details? [0] > Also, is the statement regarding opennet being "relatively easy to > block" accurate in this context? meaning that it is easier to block than > Tor connections? I'd say so - the list of opennet seed nodes is public,[1] so blocking access to those IPs would mean no opennet. > -- > Robert Hailey [0] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/hidden-services-need-some-love [1] https://downloads.freenetproject.org/alpha/opennet/seednodes.fref
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [email protected] https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
