The leaked files on Tor suggest it is significantly stronger than at least I had assumed.
It might be interesting to create a simple, but cryptographically verified, TCP-based protocol for communicating with gateways through tunnels, to protect the first hop. This would be a "transient" request/response protocol handling binary blobs; clients would route the first hop (at least on opennet) through these tunnels, verify returned content, and possibly label requests to keep them on separate tunnels. On darknet we will eventually protect the first hop via PISCES tunnels, however IMHO this is some way off and there are (probably) very few darknet users at present. We could then ask Tor for a directory server flag, although they might say no if Freenet is seen as "filesharing" and therefore obnoxious. DoS issues might result in some servers asking for payment, although creating a business model is often a good way to fund your attackers (especially if the gateways are anonymised); this is why a classic mixnet doesn't work for bitcoin, for example (don't trust anything without provable blinding). tgs3 and various people on Frost have been suggesting this for some time. IMHO Tor is preferable to I2P (assuming the NSA stuff isn't a false trail, which it might be), but it could work with either. Arguably we should use a normal transport, we're some way away from having TCP-based transport plugins though... and this could be a fairly simple protocol, we can transfer a single block (key) at a time as a single message. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document
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