Lee writes: > I'm not sure there's any value at all to half a loaf here. Certainly we > have to implement data store encryption, and even a simple implementation > of that accomplishes important goals. But what important goal can be > accomplished by simple node-to-node encryption? Without the full monty > of PK authentication, it will be possible to identify Freenet traffic > whether encrypted or not, and simple data estore ncryption will prevent > content-based attacks.
It would be useful against an attacker who wanted to see what data someone was downloading and was eavesdropping on his line. Client encryption of node data only goes so far; there has to be some way of guessing the key and if the client can do it, the eavesdropper may be able to do so as well (especially if he saw the client download a web page with a Freenet link that included the key). Without authentication though the system is still vulnerable to active attacks, someone who can act as a "man in the middle" and meddle with the key agreement protocol. Or, as Oskar says, they can simply join the Freenet as a node and get some information from there about who is requesting what data. (This part presumably works even with authentication.) This gives me an idea for an interesting attack: someone wants to know who is downloading some notorious, sensitive data file, like the article about how Cubans should be free to emigrate. They run a node which creates some bogus articles which hash to be close to the target one, by exhaustive search. It then submits them into the network, making itself a data source for hashes similar to the target. This will tend to lure requests for the data, or inserts for it as well, towards itself. Does this work? Hal _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
