Yes, but if all communication is encrypted, and you start with one address for which you know the public key, and then the attacker won't be able to exchange the keys on replies you get from that node. And then he won't be able to exchange the keys on replies you get from the nodes you got references to in replies from the first node.
For this system to work perfectly, then the security procedures have to be perfect everywhere on the network, which they of course won't be, but even if an attacker can break in and place a false key for an address somewhere, all he will have done is the equivalent of running a node. It is if he can pretend to be all the different nodes around you that he is dangerous, which would be arguably next to impossible with a system like this. On Sun, 30 Apr 2000, hal at finney.org wrote: > > Hmmm, yes, I see your point. I guess we should not go with the > > public-key in address idea - but I still fail to see why people are > > saying inter-node encryption is so difficult to achieve. > > The main problem in the face of active attacks is to securely get the > right keys for other nodes. If an attacker can trick you into accepting > a bad key, then he can play "man in the middle" and decrypt/re-encrypt > the traffic between you and the other node. > > Hal > > _______________________________________________ > Freenet-dev mailing list > Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net > http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev -- Oskar Sandberg md98-osa at nada.kth.se #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/) _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
