Brandon wrote: > > > attacks, like an evil person inserting a multipart file into Freenet, > > listing > > the correct parts in an SVK, but then including false information in the > > public > > metadata of those parts. Nodes would then be oblivious to the fact they are > > parts of the same file, and the node would be open to attack. > > I don't see how you could ever counter an attack of this type, in the > sense that "parts" can always be "grouped" in a way that is unknown to the > node. You could, for instance, have a link page with all of the parts > listed on it. The only solution I can think of is to have clients only > automatically assemble "properly" split and labelled files so that users > would be encouraged by the system to not download files split in weird > ways. This seems like a cheap hack, but I can't think of any better way to > do it.
Yes, good point. If any related group of documents are found on a node, then plausible deniablity is downgraded somewhat, since the probability of those documents with wildly different keys turning up on the same node by chance is low, especially if they are unpopular documents. This is unless someone else requested the documents exclusively using our node as the first hop in the request. Yet another reason for onion routing, I guess. (the caching of the document would start at the end of the onion, since our local node cannot see the data anyway - the onion starts at the client, doesn't it?) _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
