[ snip long security argument ]
PROPOSAL: Before we encode any splitfile we should encrypt the whole thing with a random key. The big advantage is that an attacker will not be able to predict the keys being inserted, even if he knows what data is to be inserted. Obviously this depends on us not calculating the key until we have inserted all the rest of the file etc (the first proposal). PROBLEMS: One great thing about Freenet is that CHKs collide: if two people insert the same content as CHK@ with the same metadata they get the same key, if they insert the same content with different metadata we still reuse the sub-blocks. This would ruin that. Is it worth it? Is there any safe mechanism we can build to enable re-use of inserted data even with this randomised encryption? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20071219/30107953/attachment.pgp>
