On Dec 19, 2007 6:19 PM, Matthew Toseland <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org> wrote: > [ snip long security argument ] > > PROPOSAL: > Before we encode any splitfile we should encrypt the whole thing with a random > key. The big advantage is that an attacker will not be able to predict the > keys being inserted, even if he knows what data is to be inserted. Obviously > this depends on us not calculating the key until we have inserted all the > rest of the file etc (the first proposal). > PROBLEMS: > One great thing about Freenet is that CHKs collide: if two people insert the > same content as CHK@ with the same metadata they get the same key, if they > insert the same content with different metadata we still reuse the > sub-blocks. This would ruin that. Is it worth it? Is there any safe mechanism > we can build to enable re-use of inserted data even with this randomised > encryption?
How would this affect Freesite inserts? If most of the files on a Freesite haven't changed are we going to end up inserting and retrieving the whole thing for every update, or is this how it already works? -- I may disagree with what you have to say, but I shall defend, to the death, your right to say it. - Voltaire Those who would give up Liberty, to purchase temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. - Ben Franklin
