Matthew Toseland wrote: > One classic strategy from mixmaster etc is to have a long delay at each step. > We could do this for the more sensitive requests. The objective would be to > send on the requests (more likely inserts) in groups big enough to likely > contain requests from all the nodes in the cell.
Yup, you could definitely make timing attacks difficult if you're willing to pay the price in latency. Could be useful for things like Frost. >> Do you mean every node calculates the trust thresholds from one node's >> perspective, or each node calculates them from its own perspective? > > How about a node can't join the cell unless its credibility with all or most > other members is over some value? Sounds promising - but could that result in some nodes not being allowed to join any cell? Also, a node on one edge of the cell needs to be able to calculate trust scores from the point of view of a node on the opposite edge, so you have to spread the topology information twice as far. Cheers, Michael
