On Saturday 21 May 2011 07:32:56 Volodya wrote: > On 05/14/2011 03:02 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote: > > Our old friend sdiz came up with some interesting, if depressing, news from > > China: <sdiz> just some news from china -- no english media have reported > > this yet... china gfw have "upgraded". if your ip have download too much > > data from foreign hosts, it is blocked from accessing any foreign ip. <sdiz> > > they call it "the whitelist", because all foreign host expect a short > > whitelist are affected > > > > Given that there is no obvious evidence of a lot of chinese users on > > freenet, > > and yet the recent survey showed that Freenet is the most trusted > > circumvention tool in China, there is some chance that there is already a > > large Chinese darknet, but I doubt it. > > > > In any case, our options appear to be: > > > > 1) Try to make opennet work in China. We could do some sort of selective > > announcement protocol, but the problem with this is: a) Why would any > > chinese > > nodes be connected / reachable through an announcement from a western node? > > b) We'd need to reannounce every time we reconnect. Most people in China > > have > > limited uptime because of how broadband is sold. > > > > We could try to rotate links even, so that only a few nodes have external > > connections at a time. The catch is that we don't know what the limit above > > is, and it will probably vary from time to time. So this is probably a > > dead-end. > > > > 2) Focus on darknet. This is my preferred option. There are a number of > > relatively easy things we can do to make darknet easier and perform better, > > such as FOAF connections and invites. Difficulties: a) If the Chinese > > darknet > > is completely sealed off from the western network, how would they even get > > software updates? We need better tools for migrating binary blobs. b) We > > need > > some way to ensure that FOAF connections don't result in dangerous external > > connections. > > > > In any case we should add an option to warn about / not connect to peers > > outside or inside a given jurisdiction. > > > > Thoughts? > > A long time ago there was a talk on what happens when a completely closed Dark > network gets a single connection (or a couple of connections) to the outside > world. If i recall correctly you said that currently it breaks the routing > quite > significantly (from the outside the whole network is seen as a single point). > In > here the problem is even larger, it is possible to have a closed darknet, and > then every so often somebody can connect to the outside larger network. That > "brave node" may be different, thus the location of the "point" which is > connecting will change (when looking at this darknet from outside). > > Has something changed to make the closed darknet be able to connect to the > larger network via a single connection?
Vive did simulations of such scenarios. It doesn't grossly break. IMHO manual content migration is probably going to be the only feasible bridging option though... :| -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20110521/0f730883/attachment.pgp>
