That text is not very clear to say the least. It's written in a very passive voice. What is wrong with the text I provided? It should be made very explicit like I did with what the responsibility of the sender and receiver is.

Mike

On 1/25/21 9:40 AM, Seth Blank wrote:
Michael, as an individual, I don't disagree. What's not clear about the current text?

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489#section-7.2.1.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489#section-7.2.1.1>

    Email streams carrying DMARC feedback data MUST conform to the DMARC
    mechanism, thereby resulting in an aligned "pass" (seeSection 3.1  
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489#section-3.1>).
    This practice minimizes the risk of report consumers processing
    fraudulent reports.

On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:32 AM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>> wrote:

    Why is this controversial? Seriously. What is controversial about
    saying that the a report should authenticate? The onus is on the
    people who say it does not to lay out the case for why it's not a
    problem, not me. #98 has a simple piece of text to remedy this.
    it's 2021. You don't use unauthenticated data if you can possibly
    help it.

    Mike

    On 1/25/21 9:25 AM, Seth Blank wrote:
    Mike, how do you believe DMARC reports are consumed and utilized?
    I think you have a misunderstanding here which is why you're
    going down this path and everyone else is pushing back.

    On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:22 AM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com
    <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>> wrote:

        Taking in information from unauthenticated sources and acting
        on it is an operational problem per se. Have we learned
        nothing in the last 30 years?

        Mike

        On 1/25/21 9:19 AM, Seth Blank wrote:
        What operational problem are we solving here? Absent
        evidence of a problem and strong consensus on the solution,
        let's close these tickets and move on.

        On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:10 AM Douglas Foster
        <dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com
        <mailto:dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com>> wrote:

            Since the status quo is unauthenticated, I wonder if
            adding a signing requirement will help.
            Will recipients discad unsigned messages, or accept
            whatever is available to maximize their information
            capture?  I suspect they will conrinye to accept everything.

            I think we would need an identified threat before
            recipients would be motivated to discard.

            But what about John's problems with receiving reports
            that should not have gone to him?   I did not understand
            the root cause, but I would hope there is something that
            can be done. Would signing help receiving sites, those
            with less sophistication than he has, be able to sort
            out noise more effectively?


            On Mon, Jan 25, 2021, 11:51 AM Michael Thomas
            <m...@mtcc.com <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>> wrote:


                On 1/25/21 8:44 AM, Todd Herr wrote:
                On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Thomas
                <m...@mtcc.com <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>> wrote:


                    The main thing I've learned over the years of
                    dealing with security is to not underestimate
                    what a motivated attacker can do. Your
                    imagination is not the same as their
                    imagination. Closing #98 in particular is
                    absolutely ridiculous: the report should
                    already have a DKIM signature or SPF so it's
                    just a matter of making sure its valid. Why
                    would you *not* want to insure that? The amount
                    of justification for *not* having the receiver
                    authenticate it is a mountain. The amount of
                    effort to authenticate it is trivial for mail.
                    Levine's dismissal of security concerns because
                    he has anecdotal "evidence" from a backwater
                    domain carries no weight at all.


                That's all well and good, but you haven't answered
                the question I asked.

                What threats do you have in mind? Put another way,
                how do you envision an attacker exploiting the lack
                of authentication in a DMARC report to his or her gain?

                No, sorry, the onus is on the people who don't think
                it can be gamed. A bald assertion that it can't be
                gamed is very unconvincing. You need to lay out a
                miles long case for why it cannot be gamed. And to
                what end? #98 has a simple piece of text that should
                be added to DMARC to eliminate the possibility of
                forgery. You'd need a 10 page threat I-D to explain
                why it's not necessary. What is the point of that?
                For email, it's trivial to prevent forgeries. Why
                would anybody argue against that?

                Mike

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