On Wed 12/Apr/2023 13:41:16 +0200 Laura Atkins wrote:
On 12 Apr 2023, at 12:21, Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

Any form of security creates inconvenience.

Yes. And we make tradeoffs between that. In this case, the security is ensuring 
that users at specific domains can and should only send mail through approved 
channels managed by those domains. Many users have violated those security 
policies, by participating in mailing lists. This caused problems for other 
folks on the mailing lists - as they were the ones removed from the list due to 
the security policy. The lists responded by rewriting. This causes yet more 
inconvenience to other subscribers and, additionally, allows the users to 
bypass their domain security policy.

I am not seeing how this creates an arena of security.


Security is not From: munging.  That's the workaround that security requires.


Based on the header rewriting done by IETF, I have a hard time seeing how its 
rewrite of Comcast addresses can cause any of the problems that you cite.

That’s how the IETF rewrites, it’s not how everyone rewrites.


Couldn't the IETF say how to rewrite?


But does your domain require even headers to be rewritten?    Why doesn't IETF 
ask you, and omit rewrite if that is what your domain wants?

Because that doesn’t scale for the IETF.


Mailman options do scale. From: rewriting is going to fade off by first allowing single subscribers to disable it, for the posts directed to them, after their MX set up some kind of agreement with the MLM.


It is hard for me to cry over mailing lists when they cannot ensure that a post 
comes from the asserted poster and they cannot adapt their DMARC defenses to 
the preferences of the recipient domains.   Life is hard.   It only gets harder 
if I wait for someone else to solve problems that I can solve myself.

I don’t understand how header rewriting ensures the authenticity of a poster. 
Given the data is being modified by the MLM, it seems to me that rewriting 
compounds the problem.


It doesn't. The authenticity should be checked on entry. THIS IS ABUSE post had dkim=fail by ietfa.amsl.com, but they didn't bother rejecting for that, which is what they should have done. We are suffering all the damage caused by DMARC but don't enjoy any of the advantages it could bring.


Best
Ale
--




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