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In message <[email protected]
il.com>, Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
>Email authentication is only reliable when the message is received directly
>from the originating organization.
I don't think that's entirely true ... but let's move forward with that
[snip]
>When the limitations of DMARC are understood, I cannot construct a scenario
>where ARC data causes harm.
At $DAYJOB$ we implemented a scheme for using ARC to influence DMARC
decisions. It has no other real impact on "scoring" which is all about
email content and customer feedback.
Using ARC information worked very badly because another large provider
failed to tell us that the contents of email had been altered (to make
it malicious) by a third party ... The third party resent the email
onward via the large provider who extended the ARC chain, so when we
walked it back to the beginning we saw that the first ARC set told us to
give the email a DMARC pass, which was an incorrect conclusion.
The issue is that ARC envisages a chain of custody but the protocol
described in the RFC does nothing to check that chain doesn't include
entities that have changed the message without declaring they have done
so. So ARC data can cause harm if you think it is useful.
When $DAYJOB$ realised that trusting the ARC chain to give us a DMARC
result was counter-productive we removed the other large provider from
our trust list. They are now, months later, stripping their own ARC info
from incoming email which may improve things.
- --
richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same
Still you never see the change from day to day
And no-one notices the customs slip away"
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