A malicious in-transit alteration seems like the hardest attack to defend.
 The expectation is that most in-transit alterations are innocuous changes
made by a mailing list or spam filter, and that attackers can construct
malicious original content more easily than they can construct malicious
in-transit changes.  My attempts to look behind an intermediary has focused
on testing whether the message produced SPF Pass at origination, because
the test can be applied to any address-server pair, and a local policy
override can also be applied to any trusted address-server pair.   Even if
I can prove SPF Pass at origination, I would still be tricked by the
malicious in-transit changes.    But DKIM is also an insufficient defense,
because (1) some messages do not originate with a DKIM signature, and (2)
many domains have DMARC p=none or No Policy so we are reluctant to act on a
broken signature.

Assuming that DKIM2 allows an evaluator to see the both before and after
versions of a message, he will need a large language model to assess
whether the "after" version is maliciously different than the "before"
version.  Additionally, we will always have traffic that does not have a
DKIM2 signature.

ARC allows the intermediary to make a statement about its business
practices.   DKIM2 allows the originator to make a statement about its
messages.   The two seem complementary to me.   I guess the theory is that
p=reject domains will embrace DKIM2, so the mailing list problem will be
solved in a backhanded way:   The mailing list problem will not be enforced
against p=none domains, and DKIM2 will allow p=reject domains to
participate.  It does not really make the evaluator more secure, but it
does solve the sender problem.





On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 4:03 PM Richard Clayton <[email protected]>
wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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>
> In message <[email protected]
> il.com>, Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
>
> >Email authentication is only reliable when the message is received
> directly
> >from the originating organization.
>
> I don't think that's entirely true ... but let's move forward with that
>
> [snip]
>
> >When the limitations of DMARC are understood, I cannot construct a
> scenario
> >where ARC data causes harm.
>
> At $DAYJOB$ we implemented a scheme for using ARC to influence DMARC
> decisions. It has no other real impact on "scoring" which is all about
> email content and customer feedback.
>
> Using ARC information worked very badly because another large provider
> failed to tell us that the contents of email had been altered (to make
> it malicious) by a third party ... The third party resent the email
> onward via the large provider who extended the ARC chain, so when we
> walked it back to the beginning we saw that the first ARC set told us to
> give the email a DMARC pass, which was an incorrect conclusion.
>
> The issue is that ARC envisages a chain of custody but the protocol
> described in the RFC does nothing to check that chain doesn't include
> entities that have changed the message without declaring they have done
> so. So ARC data can cause harm if you think it is useful.
>
> When $DAYJOB$ realised that trusting the ARC chain to give us a DMARC
> result was counter-productive we removed the other large provider from
> our trust list. They are now, months later, stripping their own ARC info
> from incoming email which may improve things.
>
> - --
> richard @ highwayman . com                       "Nothing seems the same
>                           Still you never see the change from day to day
>                                 And no-one notices the customs slip away"
>
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