On Wed, May 13, 2026 at 8:27 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
> First, ARC's Experimental status not withstanding, the I-D explicitly > suggests > that DKIM2 should supersede ARC: > > This document reports the experiment’s results and explains why, with > the > emergence of the proposed successor to DKIM, currently known as > DKIM2, the > community should retire ARC and incorporate the useful pieces > directly into > the successor to DKIM. > > I find the timing of that conclusion somewhat difficult to evaluate. > DKIM2 > still appears to be at an early stage, seems to require substantial > architectural changes in MTAs, and AFAIK there is not yet significant > implementation or deployment experience. > I don't think the discussion about requiring substantial architectural changes in MTAs is either germane to what an RFC would say or a decided matter yet. I still don't think it's strictly true that MTAs will need an overhaul to support DKIM2. But that's really a debate for that WG, not this one. > Hence, if the WG proceeds with Trent's I-D, ARC could potentially be moved > to > Historic status well before DKIM2 becomes deployable in practice. In that > case, it is not entirely clear to me what “incorporate the useful pieces” > would > concretely mean, or where those useful pieces are expected to live in the > meantime. > I would interpret that sequence of events as this group acknowledging that ARC's value is dubious at best, and trusting the DKIM WG to determine whether any of ARC is salvageable and to include those parts (if any) in DKIM2. > Second, and more importantly, I think understanding /why/ ARC failed is > considerably more important than merely changing its status. > I agree here; the WG's output needs to document the "why". I think the charter basically requires this, though it's not as explicit as one might like. > My own current interpretation is that ARC failed because it lacks an > authorization counterpart. In other words, it can preserve authentication > context, but it does not provide a corresponding mechanism for granting > authorization. > This is a reasonable item to include, but I think it's probably part of a larger set that can be developed from the discussion on this list since Trent kicked off these conversations. > Since DKIM2 also appears to rely primarily on domain reputation, I am not > yet > seeing how it would address the mailing-list problem differently. I would > be > particularly interested in comments on that point, since it seems central > to > the overall discussion. > Reputation of the signing domain(s) is a possible part of the equation, but I don't think it can be baked into DKIM2 itself any more than it was into DKIM. Reputation remains part of the receiver's process. To me the value of DKIM2 is that it offers receivers a view into who modified what, and the opportunity to decide if those mutations were tolerable, using their own local heuristics, maybe with some advice from list operators or a BCP document. That's more information than DKIM provides. I don't know if that's a complete solution, but it's a significant improvement. An add-on could be opinionated about which mutations ought to be considered malicious. AFAICS, there are currently no concrete ARC++ proposals anyway. > +1 to that. -MSK
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