The potential benefit of ARC is that it would be applied to all traffic
flowing through an intermediary, thereby exposing the operational practices
of that intermediary, and this information indirectly reveals the
trustworthiness of the intermediary.

Richard's point has been that most intermediaries do not wish to expose
their operational practices to scrutiny, and many who do provide data prove
that they are not trustworthy.   So it probably is time for ARC to die.

Nonetheless, I object to including DKIM2 in this document, as it cannot
begin to address the goals that ARC had.

On Sat, May 16, 2026, 12:51 PM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat 16/May/2026 18:13:34 +0200 John R Levine wrote:
> >
> > What work do you propose to do to support what you're asking for?
>
>
> Mainly to understand whether the ARC experiment revealed a missing
> authorization semantic.
>
> ARC can preserve authentication results across intermediaries, but that
> is not quite the same thing as establishing whether a mediation path is
> acceptable.
>
> If the distinction turns out not to be operationally useful, then ARC's
> outcome helps establish that as well.  That negative conclusion would
> still be useful to document explicitly.
>
>
> Best
> Ale
> --
>
>
>
>
>
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