The potential benefit of ARC is that it would be applied to all traffic flowing through an intermediary, thereby exposing the operational practices of that intermediary, and this information indirectly reveals the trustworthiness of the intermediary.
Richard's point has been that most intermediaries do not wish to expose their operational practices to scrutiny, and many who do provide data prove that they are not trustworthy. So it probably is time for ARC to die. Nonetheless, I object to including DKIM2 in this document, as it cannot begin to address the goals that ARC had. On Sat, May 16, 2026, 12:51 PM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sat 16/May/2026 18:13:34 +0200 John R Levine wrote: > > > > What work do you propose to do to support what you're asking for? > > > Mainly to understand whether the ARC experiment revealed a missing > authorization semantic. > > ARC can preserve authentication results across intermediaries, but that > is not quite the same thing as establishing whether a mediation path is > acceptable. > > If the distinction turns out not to be operationally useful, then ARC's > outcome helps establish that as well. That negative conclusion would > still be useful to document explicitly. > > > Best > Ale > -- > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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