Email authentication seeks to establish these things:

   - That the originating organization acted properly by transmitting a
   message on behalf of the original RFC5321.MailFrom domain.
   - That the originating RFC5321.MailFrom domain acted properly by
   transmitting a message on behalf of the RFC5322.From domain
   - That the original intent of the message has not been meaningfully
   altered by any intervening changes made to the message.

The first of these objectives is the most important, because the other two
are meaningless unless the first objective has been accomplished.   It is
achieved when one of these criteria are satisfied:

   - When the message produces SPF Pass, based on the originating
   organization's external IP address and the message's original
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain.

   - When the message contains a DKIM signature for the RFC5321.MailFrom
   domain, and the signature was applied by the originating organization.

   - When local policy of the recipient organization applies
   private knowledge to conclude that the message is authentic when the
   original RFC5321.MailFrom domain is associated with the originating
   organization's server organization, and the identity of the originating
   server organization is verified using forward-confirmed DNS on the server
   host name.

   - When local policy of the recipient organization applies private
   knowledge to conclude that the message is authentic when the original
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain is associated with the original organization's
   external IP address.

   - When the message contains a DKIM signature for the originating
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain, and the signature was applied by an outgoing
   gateway service, and local policy of the recipient organization applies
   private knowledge that the outgoing gateway service has authenticated the
   originating organization by some method other than SPF.

All five of these techniques depend on correctly identifying the
originating organization, a topic which has not been adequately explored
and which is non-trivial.

ARC fails because it assumes that the originating message identities will
be known to the organization which creates the first ARC set, that the ARC
set will report a complete set of the originating message's identifiers,
and that the information will be reported accurately.   All of these
assumptions seem to be unsupported by operational experience, and thus ARC
is viewed as a failure.

SPF does not consider the authenticating possibilities of DKIM, because it
seeks to permit decision making immediately Mail From command, before DKIM
information is available.  Consequently, DKIM authentication of the
RFC5321.MailFrom is only suggested obliquely, when DMARC authenticates a
message based on DKIM and the RFC5321.MailFrom domain is aligned with the
RFC5322.From domain.

The final three points depend on local policy, which this WG usually
refuses to discuss.   Yet the DKIM component of DMARC implicitly assumes
that local policy will trust a signature created by a downstream server as
equally valid with a signature created by the originating organization.  To
my understanding, DKIM2 expects to preserve the assumption that a
signature's validity is independent of when it is created.

The other local policy techniques are relevant to this topic for the simple
reason that impersonation remains possible as long as authentication is
ambiguous, so any attempt to improve authentication must consider how
exceptions will be handled.   SPF errors are common.   One statistic cited
to this WG is that about 8% of SPF policies are flawed.   Confronted with
SPF errors and omissions, a reasonable security administrator will seek to
rule impersonation in or out by other methods, and then document that
decision in local policy.

The best way to obtain accurate identification of an originating
organization is not with ARC, but with Received.   A most useful Received
header field will contain all of this information, formatted consistently:
     HELO (ReverseDNS IPAddress) ... for ToIUser@ToDomain (envelope-from
<FromUser@FromDomain>)
For those who view usernames as a privacy violation, a truncated address
would provide sufficient information for our authentication purposes:
     HELO (ReverseDNS IPAddress) ... for @ToDomain (envelope-from
<@FromDomain>)

I tried to influence the RFC5321 rewrite project to include guidelines
about Received formatting, but they rejected the suggestion as a battle
they were not willing to fight.   The need persists.

Doug Foster
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