This is in response to Richard's request for an outbound gateway example.

Clients can use Outlook.com as a submission server and as an outbound
gateway service.

When used as a submission server, the first Received header field reports a
MAPI connection from an Outlook.com server to itself, over a private IP
address.  Before the message leaves Outlook.Com, they create a false ARC
set which asserts SPF=pass, DKIM=pass, DMARC=pass.   The SPF result has no
supporting parameters, because everything associated with the client device
has been hidden for privacy reasons, the DMARC policy may not exist, and
the DKIM signature only exists after Outlook.com creates it.   This seems
to be their unique alternative to publishing an ARC set with AUTH=pass.   I
am not providing an example because this odd behavior is pretty easy to
remedy in local policy.

When used as an outbound gateway service, the Received data is not
obfuscated.  Outlook.com performs SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks, which it
reports accurately as an ARC set.   Then it ignores the results, signs the
message, and sends it on its way.   Fortunately, the messages are usually
legitimate.  Below are message headers from a Xerox email.    In this
example, the host names on the earliest Received header fields suggest that
the message actually originates at Xerox, but the host names cannot be
verified with forward-confirmed DNS, and the message fails SPF, so there is
no reliable evidence that the message is legitimate.

This might be cute if we had no evidence that outbound gateway services can
be duped.   EchoSpoof is one successful breach that received headlines.

In the example below, white space has been added for readability, long
hashes have been redacted, and receiver details have been redacted.

Doug Foster



 return-path: [email protected]

received: from esa16.xerox.iphmx.com (esa16.xerox.iphmx.com [68.232.143.66])
 by <redacted>
 with SMTP (version=TLS\Tls12 cipher=Aes256 bits=256);
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:34:43 -0400

dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=xerox.com;
 [email protected]; q=dns/txt; s=Aug2018; t=1775136883; x=1806672883;
 h=date:from:to:message-id:subject:mime-version;
 bh=t4uDrS6mhfzcVmVY00VJk7verQHS03bxVb1TdKj7gwY=;
 b=<redacted>;

received: from mail-westus2azon11020120.outbound.protection.outlook.com
 (HELO CO1PR03CU002.outbound.protection.outlook.com)
 ([52.101.46.120])
 by ob1.xerox.iphmx.com
 with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;
 02 Apr 2026 08:34:37 -0500

arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector10001; d=microsoft.com; cv=none;
 b=<redacted>

arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;
s=arcselector10001;
 
h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1;
 bh=mUW3/fYwh1jxSOGIsaSRF9wmAk/KeyBXn5DdpAGuZWA=;
 b=<redcated>

arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1;
 spf=softfail (sender ip is 65.207.111.244) smtp.rcpttodomain=<redacted>
smtp.mailfrom=xerox.com;
 dmarc=fail (p=quarantine sp=none pct=100) action=quarantine header.from=
xerox.com;
 dkim=none (message not signed); arc=none (0)

received: from SJ0PR03CA0258.namprd03.prod.outlook.com
(2603:10b6:a03:3a0::23)
 by DS0PR11MB7192.namprd11.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:8:13a::22)
 with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2,
cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
 id 15.20.9769.17;
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 13:34:34 +0000

received: from BY1PEPF0001AE1A.namprd04.prod.outlook.com
(2603:10b6:a03:3a0:cafe::2)
 by SJ0PR03CA0258.outlook.office365.com (2603:10b6:a03:3a0::23)
 with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
 id 15.20.9745.30 via Frontend Transport;
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 13:34:34 +0000

received: from USA0300EX003.na.xerox.net (65.207.111.244)
 by BY1PEPF0001AE1A.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.167.242.102)
 with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2,
cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)
 id 15.20.9769.17
 via Frontend Transport;
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 13:34:32 +0000

received: from USA0300EX4514.na.xerox.net (13.129.90.86)
 by USA0300EX003.na.xerox.net (13.129.90.93)
 with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2,
cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256)
 id 15.1.2507.55;
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:34:30 -0400

received: from USA1475VM06919.na.xerox.net (10.31.213.102)
 by USA0300EX4514.na.xerox.net (13.129.90.86)
 with Microsoft SMTP Server
 id 15.2.1748.10
 via Frontend Transport;
 Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:34:30 -0400

date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:34:30 -0400

from: [email protected]

On Mon, Jun 1, 2026 at 9:29 AM Richard Clayton <[email protected]>
wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> In message <[email protected]
> il.com>, Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
>
> >Richard, I am severely disappointed by your critique.
>
> I think that's to be expected :)
>
> >It misses the conclusion, which is that we have a missed opportunity
> >because SMTP state is not preserved in the Received header field.
>
> as you observed yourself ... the relevant WG took the view that it was
> not realistic to attempt to address the wide variation of validly
> formatted (but super-hard to parse) Received header fields. I concur
> with that view.
>
> >   This
> >can change by convincing the relatively small number of MTA software
> >providers to alter how they construct a Received header field.
>
> we think the number of markedly distinct DKIM codebases out there is
> probably less than 20 ... because most people started from one of the
> libraries that were implemented at an early stage
>
> If there are less than 1000 distinct SMTP codebases I would be rather
> surprised. This is of course relatively small compared with the half
> million or so systems that regularly send email. But it is still quite a
> substantial number of cats to shepherd
>
> >An overly-broad SPF policy is a problem, but it can be corrected by local
> >policy that limits acceptable results to a smaller set of source servers.
> >  This is not much different than using local policy to correct a
> published
> >SPF policy from "IP:address" to "IP4:address" to avoid a PermError result.
>
> I have never tried to do that ... do you have much success. The main
> reason that people set their SPF to be "anywhere in this cloud" is
> because they are spinning resources up and down according to demand and
> so they truly do not know where they will be sending from next
>
> [...]
>
> >we routinely receive ARC
> >sets which indicate that a message was signed after failing SPF, DKIM, and
> >DMARC,   We hope that the outbound gateway authenticated the client by
> some
> >method other than SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, but we cannot know.
>
> I think some examples would assist this WG in understanding how
> successful the ARC experiment has actually been. Some people have been
> lauding its value to them == perhaps they don't get email from the
> relevant senders, or perhaps they have been fooled !
>
> >There are other problems with DKIM.
>
> which is relevant to this WG in what way ?
>
> - --
> richard @ highwayman . com                       "Nothing seems the same
>                           Still you never see the change from day to day
>                                 And no-one notices the customs slip away"
>
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> n2qh8I4AzaMarnk2jl06mxOr
> =M7q4
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
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