For context, my input is based on my involvement in two primary sectors: furthering effective interoperable specification development, and as a representative of a reasonably large email security gateway that handles a large volume of email.
Combining my experience in both sectors, my responses to the two points are embedded below: > Claim 1. ARC is actively deployed and utilized That is undoubtedly true. We see evidence of ARC headers every day (primarily coming from a single source — by a LARGE margin). The problem is that, from what we can tell, only the last hop signature appears to be utilized to any measurable extent with all earlier signed hops being ignored. So… yes… ARC has been deployed and is used… but not for what it was intended. And any continued focus, time, money spent on it is actively draining resources from fulfilling the theory / hypothesis upon which we based the original ARC experiment. > Claim 2. No interoperable replacement is yet published This is arguable based upon the definition of “published”. The DKIM2 draft specifications that includes ARC-like functionality has been published via the DKIM Working Group. While the proposed specifications and associated drafts haven’t been published as Standards Track RFCs, I am aware of at least three interoperable implementations of the current drafts in various phases of completion. Various interoperability events (some of which have been conducted under the auspices of the IETF) have already taken place. And once again… for those of us without infinite resources to spend supporting experiments that have run their course at the same time as implementing the learnings from the experiment… moving the ARC experiment to “Historic” status will significantly free up resources to support the interoperable specification development process as well as increase the speed in bringing said technologies to market (ultimately improving security for us all). In short… leaving the ARC RFC as-is continues to feed ambiguity into the system and is ultimately slowing everything down. I hope that helps clarify the situation from my perspective and helps tick the boxes in the consensus conversation initiated by Barry. Thanks, Trent From: Barry Leiba <[email protected]> Date: Saturday, July 18, 2026 at 1:34 PM To: DMARC Working Group <[email protected]> Subject: [dmarc-ietf] Re: Evaluating consensus on the idea of making ARC "Historic" This Message Is From an Untrusted Sender You have not previously corresponded with this sender. Report Suspicious<https://us-phishalarm-ewt.proofpoint.com/EWT/v1/ORgEfCBsr282Fw!YLP3Cs7RtFzudvuYvj_6nXV29St8gN_HUycrqQzIq6e1-AtmFI6Ejwftk5grM7zKDlZB3_4AL9wUWhR7W2v5wdkt8IcGkwafntePsQGRZsr2LZLWg7qtZMhTg9Bg$> The objection collection period is over, and we seem to have clear consensus on Seth's objection, among those objecting: > I think we should NOT make ARC historic, yet. > > 1. ARC is actively deployed and utilized > 2. No interoperable replacement is yet published > > I acknowledge ARC is not as useful as we'd hoped, and we've learned a good > deal which has been > woven into DKIM2. I do not at all object to ultimately making the move to > historic. > > I simply believe DKIM2 should obsolete / make ARC historic when it publishes, > so there's a clear upgrade > path. i.e. when we have a new protocol that works and interoperates, that's > the culmination of the > experiment and when the bit flips. Point 1 supposes that there's deployment of both applying ARC seals *and* checking them; it would be good to have some real data on the latter -- are they being widely checked and do those who are checking them find the results useful? Point 2 simply asks that we defer a decision on setting ARC aside until after DKIM 2 is ready and we have some validation of it. The next step is for those who still want to proceed with making ARC Historic *now*... to respond to these objections and either accept the suggestion to wait, or to address reasons we should not. Just as I would like to see data about point 1, I would also like to see data from those who reject point 1, to the extent that we have any. "No it's not," won't, by itself, be a sufficient addressing of the objection. That probably means that we need to hear from some of the major email services. The discussion of this starts now, and let's give it two weeks *after* the IETF meeting is over -- so let's say we give it until 7 August and then see where we are. Again, please keep the discussion focused and concise. It'll be much easier for everyone to follow along if we make our points concisely. Barry, as chair _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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