In our case I'm referring to originated mail, not forwarding/SPF upgrade scenarios.

Over roughly the last 12–18 months we've seen a noticeable change at OVH. More recently, a significant fraction of mail from OVH customers arrives through their centralized outbound SMTP infrastructure (e.g. |*.mo574.mail-out.ovh.net|), so it appears they are encouraging or enforcing the use of managed outbound relays.

Before that, however, we saw very large malware and phishing waves originating directly from customer VPSes (typically |vps-*.ovh.net|). Operationally, the Return-Path and visible From: covered a very wide variety of domains. I can't say what controls OVH applied at account creation or submission time, only that from the receiver's perspective these systems generated a substantial amount of abuse. Eventually we ended up scoring entire hosting ranges because individual IP reputation couldn't keep up with the churn.

We're a multi-tenant perimeter provider, and many of the organizations we protect still have relatively weak SPF/DMARC deployments. As a result, attacks using lookalike or impersonated From: addresses remain common in our environment, even if they don't always involve a strict RFC 5322.From / RFC 5321.MailFrom mismatch.

So my earlier comment was more about where the abuse originates (hosting providers and residential networks with open port 25) than about confirmed two-address impersonation specifically.

Separately, as a receiver and forwarding service, we've become increasingly interested in ARC because legitimate aliases and Sieve redirects can otherwise cause SPF/DMARC failures downstream, which in turn may negatively affect the reputation of forwarding MTAs. That's a different problem from the abuse originating on hosting providers, but it's one we've also encountered operationally.

Carlos Horowicz
Planisys

On 27/07/2026 01:08, Douglas Foster wrote:
Are you saying that ovh and some others ensure a correct Mail From address but allow arbitrary From addresses?  I expect most hosting services to prevent that.   I also expect attackers to avoid environments that require them to expose their identity.

Are you seeing this on originated mail or is it SPF upgrade trickery via forwarding though the hosting service?


My 1000 to 1 estimate is based on several years experience requiring SPF Pass or equivalent in local policy.  Only on the last 90 days have I found a confirmed case of two address impersonation.  Once it was confirmed, I created exceptions for acceptable ESPs and others, then began requiring From authentication via DMARC or equivalent in local policy.  The tighter block rule catches very little impersonation

DF




On Sun, Jul 26, 2026, 5:42 PM Carlos Horowicz <[email protected]> wrote:

    Hosting (in particular ovh) has been the biggest source of waves
    of malicious email in the last 12-18 months ... not necessarily
    bare metal

    Residential FTTH-like services that have port 25 open are also a
    huge source of spam, malware, etc

    Last but not least, some sporadic malicious campaigns of mails
    containing phishing+malware links via sendgrid ... these are very
    expensive to detect

    Carlos Horowicz
    Planisys

    On 26/07/2026 22:09, Bron Gondwana wrote:
    On Sat, Jul 25, 2026, at 13:07, Douglas Foster wrote:
    Essentially all malicious impersonation come from clients of
    bare-metal hosting services, when those hosting services do not
    restrict outbound SMTP.

    I'd be interested to know if other receivers agree that this is
    their main source of impersonated email in 2026.

    Bron.

    --
      Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC
    [email protected]



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