I just checked my data now that I am in the office.  Impersonation sources
in last 60 days:
75% googleusercontent.com
20% unverifiable host name
  5% all other sources

Application development platforms like Googleusercontent are a problem, and
deserve their own category, because they often allow unauthenticated
email.  My original comments are related to the 20%

Doug Foster



On Mon, Jul 27, 2026, 6:02 AM Carlos Horowicz <[email protected]> wrote:

> In our case I'm referring to originated mail, not forwarding/SPF upgrade
> scenarios.
>
> Over roughly the last 12–18 months we've seen a noticeable change at OVH.
> More recently, a significant fraction of mail from OVH customers arrives
> through their centralized outbound SMTP infrastructure (e.g. *.
> mo574.mail-out.ovh.net), so it appears they are encouraging or enforcing
> the use of managed outbound relays.
>
> Before that, however, we saw very large malware and phishing waves
> originating directly from customer VPSes (typically vps-*.ovh.net).
> Operationally, the Return-Path and visible From: covered a very wide
> variety of domains. I can't say what controls OVH applied at account
> creation or submission time, only that from the receiver's perspective
> these systems generated a substantial amount of abuse. Eventually we ended
> up scoring entire hosting ranges because individual IP reputation couldn't
> keep up with the churn.
>
> We're a multi-tenant perimeter provider, and many of the organizations we
> protect still have relatively weak SPF/DMARC deployments. As a result,
> attacks using lookalike or impersonated From: addresses remain common in
> our environment, even if they don't always involve a strict RFC 5322.From /
> RFC 5321.MailFrom mismatch.
>
> So my earlier comment was more about where the abuse originates (hosting
> providers and residential networks with open port 25) than about confirmed
> two-address impersonation specifically.
>
> Separately, as a receiver and forwarding service, we've become
> increasingly interested in ARC because legitimate aliases and Sieve
> redirects can otherwise cause SPF/DMARC failures downstream, which in turn
> may negatively affect the reputation of forwarding MTAs. That's a different
> problem from the abuse originating on hosting providers, but it's one we've
> also encountered operationally.
>
> Carlos Horowicz
> Planisys
> On 27/07/2026 01:08, Douglas Foster wrote:
>
> Are you saying that ovh and some others ensure a correct Mail From address
> but allow arbitrary From addresses?   I expect most hosting services to
> prevent that.   I also expect attackers to avoid environments that require
> them to expose their identity.
>
> Are you seeing this on originated mail or is it SPF upgrade trickery via
> forwarding though the hosting service?
>
>
> My 1000 to 1 estimate is based on several years experience requiring SPF
> Pass or equivalent in local policy.   Only on the last 90 days have I found
> a confirmed case of two address impersonation.  Once it was confirmed, I
> created exceptions for acceptable ESPs and others, then began requiring
> From authentication via DMARC or equivalent in local policy.  The tighter
> block rule catches very little impersonation
>
> DF
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 26, 2026, 5:42 PM Carlos Horowicz <carlos=
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Hosting (in particular ovh) has been the biggest source of waves of
>> malicious email in the last 12-18 months ... not necessarily bare metal
>>
>> Residential FTTH-like services that have port 25 open are also a huge
>> source of spam, malware, etc
>>
>> Last but not least, some sporadic malicious campaigns of mails containing
>> phishing+malware links via sendgrid ... these are very expensive to detect
>>
>> Carlos Horowicz
>> Planisys
>> On 26/07/2026 22:09, Bron Gondwana wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 25, 2026, at 13:07, Douglas Foster wrote:
>>
>> Essentially all malicious impersonation come from clients of bare-metal
>> hosting services, when those hosting services do not restrict outbound
>> SMTP.
>>
>>
>> I'd be interested to know if other receivers agree that this is their
>> main source of impersonated email in 2026.
>>
>> Bron.
>>
>> --
>>   Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC
>>   [email protected]
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
>>
>
_______________________________________________
dmarc mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to