I just checked my data now that I am in the office. Impersonation sources in last 60 days: 75% googleusercontent.com 20% unverifiable host name 5% all other sources
Application development platforms like Googleusercontent are a problem, and deserve their own category, because they often allow unauthenticated email. My original comments are related to the 20% Doug Foster On Mon, Jul 27, 2026, 6:02 AM Carlos Horowicz <[email protected]> wrote: > In our case I'm referring to originated mail, not forwarding/SPF upgrade > scenarios. > > Over roughly the last 12–18 months we've seen a noticeable change at OVH. > More recently, a significant fraction of mail from OVH customers arrives > through their centralized outbound SMTP infrastructure (e.g. *. > mo574.mail-out.ovh.net), so it appears they are encouraging or enforcing > the use of managed outbound relays. > > Before that, however, we saw very large malware and phishing waves > originating directly from customer VPSes (typically vps-*.ovh.net). > Operationally, the Return-Path and visible From: covered a very wide > variety of domains. I can't say what controls OVH applied at account > creation or submission time, only that from the receiver's perspective > these systems generated a substantial amount of abuse. Eventually we ended > up scoring entire hosting ranges because individual IP reputation couldn't > keep up with the churn. > > We're a multi-tenant perimeter provider, and many of the organizations we > protect still have relatively weak SPF/DMARC deployments. As a result, > attacks using lookalike or impersonated From: addresses remain common in > our environment, even if they don't always involve a strict RFC 5322.From / > RFC 5321.MailFrom mismatch. > > So my earlier comment was more about where the abuse originates (hosting > providers and residential networks with open port 25) than about confirmed > two-address impersonation specifically. > > Separately, as a receiver and forwarding service, we've become > increasingly interested in ARC because legitimate aliases and Sieve > redirects can otherwise cause SPF/DMARC failures downstream, which in turn > may negatively affect the reputation of forwarding MTAs. That's a different > problem from the abuse originating on hosting providers, but it's one we've > also encountered operationally. > > Carlos Horowicz > Planisys > On 27/07/2026 01:08, Douglas Foster wrote: > > Are you saying that ovh and some others ensure a correct Mail From address > but allow arbitrary From addresses? I expect most hosting services to > prevent that. I also expect attackers to avoid environments that require > them to expose their identity. > > Are you seeing this on originated mail or is it SPF upgrade trickery via > forwarding though the hosting service? > > > My 1000 to 1 estimate is based on several years experience requiring SPF > Pass or equivalent in local policy. Only on the last 90 days have I found > a confirmed case of two address impersonation. Once it was confirmed, I > created exceptions for acceptable ESPs and others, then began requiring > From authentication via DMARC or equivalent in local policy. The tighter > block rule catches very little impersonation > > DF > > > > > On Sun, Jul 26, 2026, 5:42 PM Carlos Horowicz <carlos= > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Hosting (in particular ovh) has been the biggest source of waves of >> malicious email in the last 12-18 months ... not necessarily bare metal >> >> Residential FTTH-like services that have port 25 open are also a huge >> source of spam, malware, etc >> >> Last but not least, some sporadic malicious campaigns of mails containing >> phishing+malware links via sendgrid ... these are very expensive to detect >> >> Carlos Horowicz >> Planisys >> On 26/07/2026 22:09, Bron Gondwana wrote: >> >> On Sat, Jul 25, 2026, at 13:07, Douglas Foster wrote: >> >> Essentially all malicious impersonation come from clients of bare-metal >> hosting services, when those hosting services do not restrict outbound >> SMTP. >> >> >> I'd be interested to know if other receivers agree that this is their >> main source of impersonated email in 2026. >> >> Bron. >> >> -- >> Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC >> [email protected] >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> _______________________________________________ >> dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >
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