Quoting Arnt Gulbrandsen (a...@gulbrandsen.priv.no): > Reminds me of the story about the airline captain who took the mike > to apologise to the passengers for a delay: "I was held up in the > security control, they were worried that I might seize control of > the airplane."
Funny that you should mention that: You might actually have seen that tale as related by _me_ on Risks Digest. http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.01.html#subj8 > Imagine a host with hundreds of simultaneous users, such as (say) a > >shared ISP machine. You would absolutely not want just anyone to be > >able to shutdown or reboot the machine at will. Tberefore, the > >conventional solution to this problem is to require membership in a > >bespoke group for shutdown/reboot rights. > I believe the conventional solution is to locate such hardware > behind locked doors and make sure few people have access to the > power cables. Yes, mostly. It would be rare to permit physical console access (other than by highly trusted people) on a shared ISP machine or anything like that. In edge cases -- which really isn't likely -- one _might_ imagine a server that does significant work for remote users and simultaneously regular users were permitted use of a local console. As I mentioned about the San Francisco cybercafe's NFS/NIS master, _that_ host was physically in a locked room upstairs but the keyboard and monitor were deliberately accessible to the public downstairs -- as an example. Obviously rare, though. _______________________________________________ Dng mailing list Dng@lists.dyne.org https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/dng