> Il 11/01/2024 03:50 CET Lanlan Pan <abby...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Thanks Paul.
> 
> Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> 于2024年1月10日周三 23:01写道:
> > As I've said during the discussions on RBL and an updated version for
> > RBL, if these things are done "for the user", the best thing is to put
> > the censored answer in the authority section. This way ignorant clients
> > keep working with the censor, but knowledgable clients can DNSSEC validate
> > the censorship using the original answer and optionally present a choice
> > to the enduser. It also prevents censorship forced against the user's
> > interest. eg it makes this properly optin (eg compliant with RFC 8890)
> 
> The explicit faked answer signal:
> - In Format 1, it follows EDE, in additional section.
> - In Format 2 , it is an TXT RR, in authority section (same as faked answer). 
> I will revise it.
> 
> Knowledgable client can make its own reaction, if it gets a explicit signal 
> that it has received a faked answer.
> This can mitigate the HTTP cookies leak, especially on NXDOMAIN redirection 
> case.

I'm not against this, but I don't see which kind of resolver operator would 
want to use it.

There are only two possibilities:

1. the forging is made cooperatively, to protect the user themself, so the user 
actually asked the resolver to block certain destinations and send back a 
pointer to an error page; in this case, the client has no reason to try any of 
the circumvention strategies you describe in section 5, and doing this could 
actually endanger the user;

2. the forging is made adversarially, to protect other users from whatever this 
particular user is trying to do with the Internet; in this case, the server has 
no reason to tell the client that something special is happening, as it needs 
to prevent the client from circumventing the block; so it will not add any 
signal to the answer.

Even in case 2, resolvers who want to be more transparent and don't want to 
forge any answer could just say no + EDE 15-18, at least when that will be 
supported by browsers.

Can you see a use case that would motivate people to implement this new 
mechanism?

-- 
Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bert...@open-xchange.com 
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy

_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list
DNSOP@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop

Reply via email to