>- FIPS >- PCI-DSS >- BSI >- OWASP >- SOC2 >- PKI-industry & CAB/Forum >- TLS, IPsec/IKE, OpenPGP, SMIME, et all at IETF. >- All the cryptographers including CFRG
The problem is that none if them did an impact analysis for this draft. Yes of course, in isolation it is good to move away from SHA1. Nobody says SHA1 is great, we should promote it. RFC 8624 already says that algorithms 5 and 7 are not recommended for signing. However, going ahead and breaking things is something different. And that is exactly what is proposed here. And that is something that doesn't give security benefits. Just a reduction of security in the name of crypto purity. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
