In your letter dated Thu, 2 May 2024 09:21:29 +0200 you wrote: >In my view, it's fine to disallow signing with SHA-1-based algorithms to help >push signers towards other algorithms.
I appreciate the effort, but I'm curious what that means. As far as I know, just about all zones that start signing are not using SHA1 as part of the signature. There is not really an issue with new installations. The affected algorithms have been marked as not recommended for many years so we can assume that in just about any signer they are not the default. The problem is with existing zones who probably have an existing relationship with signer software. The IETF is not the protocol police so it seems unlikely that signers are going to suddenly remove all traces of SHA1 signing and leave their users in the dark. Worse, if signers would do that, then there is a distinct risk that people will just use old software. This may have the effect that new signers will not implement these algorithms. However, that will probably be until the first customer comes along who requests these algorithms. Adding RSA+SHA1 is trivial if you already have RSA+SHA2. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop