Dimitri,

Since I haven't seen other responses to your posted I-D or note to
the DNSOP list, some questions:  

(1) The description in your abstract and your Introduction introduce
two problems, the second of which is "Legitimate look-alikes are
reported as impersonations".   It seems to me that the opposite
problem is also important, i.e., impersonation look-alikes are
mistaken for legitimate names.  Am I correct in understanding that
you are ignoring that case, even in your Sections 1.4 and 1.5?

(2) The most important, or at least very widely reported, cases of
look-alike names involve names at the same level in the DNS
hierarchy, not parent-child relationships.  For example, one might
have questions about whether example.com and exámple.com belonged to
the same organization.  That is not a parent-child relationship.  One
might be able to answer the question with a variation on DAC and/or
one on [I-D.ietf-regext-epp-same-entity], at least assuming the TLD
registry is willing to take on such responsibility and, if different
registrars were used, even that it has access to sufficient
information.  At least some experience suggests that many registries
are unable or unwilling to do that.    The even more common case
would involve a comparison between example.com and example.foo, where
"foo" is some other TLD, supported by a different registry operator
than the one for .COM or the one between example.com and example.
Am I correct in understanding that you do not address those cases
either?

If the answer is that those cases are no addressed, my personal
(possibly not very useful, depending on what others in DNSOP have to
say) is that this proposal is probably not worth the effort except
for some very specialized cases... or that the draft needs a rework
to make the useful applicability much more clear.

good luck with it.
   john


--On Wednesday, October 21, 2026 15:49 -0700 [email protected]
wrote:

> Internet-Draft draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt is
> now available.
> 
>    Title:   Domain Affiliation Confirmation (DAC)
>    Author:  Dimitri Manelidis
>    Name:    draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt
>    Pages:   46
>    Dates:   2026-10-21
> 
> Abstract:
> 
>    Security systems assess domain names one at a time.  A new
> domain of    an established organization therefore starts with no
> reputation, and    a legitimate domain that resembles another
> organization's name can be    reported as an impersonation.  This
> document defines Domain    Affiliation Confirmation (DAC), by which
> the operator of a parent    domain confirms that a child domain is
> operated by it or under its    authority.  The child publishes a
> DNS record naming the parent and a    random token; the parent
> confirms that token, in the DNS or over    HTTPS, by naming the
> child.  Verification takes at most three DNS    queries.  The
> parent publishes no list of its domains, and an    affiliation is
> ended by deleting one record.  The document also    states what a
> confirmation means to relying parties such as takedown    services
> and reputation systems.
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affil
> iation/
> 
> There is also an HTML version available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affili
> ation-00.html
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
> rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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