Sorry, my mail client mangled the example names in my last message, they came out as long redirect links. That sentence should just say: the two names can be anything, two names under different TLDs, a name and its IDN look-alike, or two completely unrelated names.
Dimitri On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 09:43 AM, Dimitri Manelidis <[email protected]> wrote: > John, > > Thanks for reading it and for the questions. > > On (2) first, because I think my wording misled you. "Parent" and "child" > in the draft are not DNS hierarchy. They are just the two roles: the > established domain that confirms, and the domain being confirmed. They can > be any two names. https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source= > gmail&ust=1793079784897000&sa=E and example.foo, or > https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source= > gmail&ust=1793079784897000&sa=E and the IDN look-alike, or two completely > different names under different TLDs. No registry or registrar is involved, > so it works across registry operators. The only thing needed is that both > operators can publish records in their own zones. > > So yes, those cases are exactly the ones I'm trying to cover. Using > "parent" and "child" in a DNS document was a bad choice on my side. In -01 > I'll rename them to "confirming domain" and "affiliated domain", and say at > the start that the two can be anywhere in the DNS, with no delegation or > hierarchy between them. > > On (1), you are right that DAC does not tell you a look-alike is an > impersonation, and I don't think any DNS mechanism can, that is a judgement > about the name and the content. What it does do for that case: > > - if a look-alike claims to be affiliated with the real organization, the > claim fails, because only the real organization can confirm it. The > impersonator can register a look-alike of the confirming domain too and > confirm itself from there, but then all it has shown is a link to another > unknown domain. A confirmed domain gets no more standing than the domain > confirming it (Section 8.3), so a chain of look-alikes is worth nothing. > - the real organization can get a report when someone claims to be > affiliated with it and it hasn't confirmed (the f= tag, reason > "unconfirmed-token"), so it learns that someone is claiming to be it. > > I'll make both points explicit in -01 so the applicability is clearer. > > Dimitri > > On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 05:25 AM, John C Klensin <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Dimitri, >> >> Since I haven't seen other responses to your posted I-D or note to >> the DNSOP list, some questions: >> >> (1) The description in your abstract and your Introduction introduce >> two problems, the second of which is "Legitimate look-alikes are >> reported as impersonations". It seems to me that the opposite >> problem is also important, i.e., impersonation look-alikes are >> mistaken for legitimate names. Am I correct in understanding that >> you are ignoring that case, even in your Sections 1.4 and 1.5? >> >> (2) The most important, or at least very widely reported, cases of >> look-alike names involve names at the same level in the DNS >> hierarchy, not parent-child relationships. For example, one might >> have questions about whether example.com and exámple.com >> <http://xn--exmple-qta.com> belonged to >> the same organization. That is not a parent-child relationship. One >> might be able to answer the question with a variation on DAC and/or >> one on [I-D.ietf-regext-epp-same-entity], at least assuming the TLD >> registry is willing to take on such responsibility and, if different >> registrars were used, even that it has access to sufficient >> information. At least some experience suggests that many registries >> are unable or unwilling to do that. The even more common case >> would involve a comparison between example.com and example.foo, where >> "foo" is some other TLD, supported by a different registry operator >> than the one for .COM or the one between example.com and example. >> Am I correct in understanding that you do not address those cases >> either? >> >> If the answer is that those cases are no addressed, my personal >> (possibly not very useful, depending on what others in DNSOP have to >> say) is that this proposal is probably not worth the effort except >> for some very specialized cases... or that the draft needs a rework >> to make the useful applicability much more clear. >> >> good luck with it. >> john >> >> >> --On Wednesday, October 21, 2026 15:49 -0700 [email protected] >> wrote: >> >> > Internet-Draft draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt is >> > now available. >> > >> > Title: Domain Affiliation Confirmation (DAC) >> > Author: Dimitri Manelidis >> > Name: draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt >> > Pages: 46 >> > Dates: 2026-10-21 >> > >> > Abstract: >> > >> > Security systems assess domain names one at a time. A new >> > domain of an established organization therefore starts with no >> > reputation, and a legitimate domain that resembles another >> > organization's name can be reported as an impersonation. This >> > document defines Domain Affiliation Confirmation (DAC), by which >> > the operator of a parent domain confirms that a child domain is >> > operated by it or under its authority. The child publishes a >> > DNS record naming the parent and a random token; the parent >> > confirms that token, in the DNS or over HTTPS, by naming the >> > child. Verification takes at most three DNS queries. The >> > parent publishes no list of its domains, and an affiliation is >> > ended by deleting one record. The document also states what a >> > confirmation means to relying parties such as takedown services >> > and reputation systems. >> > >> > The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is: >> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affil >> > iation/ >> > >> > There is also an HTML version available at: >> > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affili >> > ation-00.html >> > >> > Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at: >> > rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > I-D-Announce mailing list -- [email protected] >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> >>
_______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
