Hi,

I've included a disclaimer below.[0]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 at 07:08:15PM -0500, Tom Barrett wrote:

[from the draft]
        What is missing is a first-party, owner-
   published, mutually verifiable declaration that lives where domain
   authority already lives: in the DNS.

Each link counts as confirmed
only when both domains name each other and both directions are retrieved
over DNSSEC, or over HTTPS from the publisher's own domain. A consumer can
start from one name it trusts and retrieve the organization's whole set.

I think, and always thought, that these two things are fundamentally the right approach. This was my basic plan with the SOPA proposal that ended up folded into and which then died with the DBOUND work. But I always thought the problem was that the initial information was not coming from the one source that ought to be authoritative, and that this effectively had to be agreement between two sides of an agreement about what it means.[1]
- From RDBD: no new RR types and no signature scheme, only TXT at an
underscored name.

I can't speak for others, but the reason SOPA used a new RRTYPE wasn't just my 
personal loathing of the underscore mechanism.  It was because of the 
bootstrapping problem: SOPA was intended to cope with any point in the tree, 
and this meant that it needed to cope with underscore domains too, so they 
couldn't be treated as special.  Once that was the criterion, the cost of the 
additional RRTYPE was nothing because special processing of certain underscore 
names to achieve the same result just shifted the pain around.

- From DBOUND: domain-set doesn't deal with policy boundaries within a
namespace

I think that is a mischaracterization.  I think it's entirely about a policy boundary: 
"is that name that is not me to be treated as somehow still me?" This is really 
the responsible person for the set publishing a policy through several statements in the 
DNS, in each so-related domain.

Let me see if I can persuade you.  Imagine a company GeneralMakestuff that operates (say) 
an airline engine company, a consumer large appliance manufacturing co, a small appliance 
manufacturing co, an industrial machinery co, and (incongruously) a finance bank.  At one 
point, these are all "the same owner" and the large holding co might want to be 
able to say so.  But after several years of corporate _excisa nervosa_, the various 
divisions cease to be leaders in their respective fields, and the main thing that is left 
of most of them is the value in the brand itself.  Each such brand is sold to Proust and 
Co[2] Holdings, which specializes in brands that are entirely about what the brand used 
to mean.  GeneralMakestuff continues operating one of its old divisions and continues to 
be a leader in that field, so it continues to have its own domain names published.

Whether Proust and Co Holdings wants to publish a record stating the names are all the same owner is 
obviously up to them.  GeneralMakestuff definitely needs to stop saying the small appliance and airplane 
engine domains are the same owner, at least at the point where one of them is sold to Proust and Co and the 
other is not.  I think the word we have to describe this kind of decision-making about how names relate to 
each other is "policy".  I don't really care if we call it something else (I am painfully aware, 
for instance, that in ICANN circles some people now distinguish between "policy" and 
"Policy")
.  Still, I think we're talking about things that can vary between two 
otherwise-similar protocol elements such that element1 might have setting v and 
element2 might have setting v', and both work just fine, and the variable is 
meaningful for some protocol, and the variable is determined by the 
element-controller in some way understood by the controller and not necessarily 
by anyone else.

Now, the reason I think this matters for the case at hand is simply that this effort is quite 
correctly being presented as extremely lightweight for the publishers of such data, but it does not 
appear (at least to me) to be lightweight for the consumer side: "browsers, security tooling, 
and increasingly autonomous or LLM-based agents evaluating a claimed relationship between two 
domains."  Apart from LLMs, this was the same set of targets I had when I started with SOPA, 
and it was the buzzkill drumbeat of "why would I?" from browsers that caused the whole 
effort to grow the hairs of DBOUND that eventually ate it.  Even when PSL maintainers said that 
SOPA could help, some voices from the browser community had made up their minds.  I worry about the 
same fate for others.  What makes this additional information useful enough to a consumer that it 
can overcome the objection from browsers either of (1) needing to do an additional lookup or (2) 
needing to invent UI/UX for a user to underst
and what difference the information makes?

Finally, this brings me to a related question: when should a consumer look for this 
information, and what might cause them to do so?  The document basically punts this as 
"known hard problem", but I'd like to suggest that this hard problem _is_ the 
problem of which the goals of the current draft are really a subset.  I don't say this to 
try to make the problem bigger and thereby put a drag on progress with this stab at the 
more-limited problem. Rather, I worry that the authors are reproducing the very steps 
that led me into the DBOUND thicket the first time.  I, too, wanted to solve a limited 
problem, but I kept running into the trouble that knowing whether a domain was in a 
position to make the assertion (because it was registered in a domain that took public 
registrations) was a necessary condition for this.  That meant that improving the PSL or 
providing an independent means to detect whether a name was in a place from which it 
could be making the assertions it was became necessar
y, and that's how I got to SOPA.

I hope those are useful observations.

Best regards,

Andrew

[0]Disclaimer: Just in case you are (like a certain long-term, apparently irony-deficient participant) inclined to send me (another) off-list mail about how my very posting here discourages other people from posting anything, please understand my remarks as in no way an attempt to discourage progress with any draft. Suggestions are offered in the spirit of, it is hoped, friendly attempts to make something potentially more useful. They are worth exactly what you paid for them, unless you are currently employing me, which you almost certainly are not.
[1] In the unlikely case anyone cares, this was because part of what was worrying me at 
the time had to do with the ICANN domain registry-registrar marketplace.  I wanted 
descendants to be able to express certain properties because I feared the emergence of 
certain "registry services" that were, in effect, extra billing opportunities 
for registries and registrars to extract cash for allowing you to do something with a 
registered domain that you were previously able to do without paying anyone.  The parent 
can, of course, always force the child side to do something because the parent can 
otherwise remove the delegation.  The idea, however, was to exploit cases where the 
parent was not willing (for extrinsic reasons) to do that (i.e. that they are regulated 
by consensus policy and so can't just delete your name because you're not paying extra 
for the privilege of doing what you used to be able to do for nothing) and then to use 
the proposed mechanism in part to defend against these act
ions by the parent.  At bottom this goal was incompatible with the thing the 
anti-mail-abuse case needed, because in that case you very much need an ancestor to be 
able to assert "not below here" contrary to whatever descendant domains might 
say.

[2] When I looked, proustandco.com was available, but proustco.com was not.  
Don't come to me with your UDRP problem later.

--
Andrew Sullivan
[email protected]
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