All,

The recent discussion of draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation (DAC),
including John Levine's pointer to RDBD and the earlier DBOUND work, led me
to look at our own draft again against all three. The draft is
draft-barrett-dnsop-domain-set-00 (
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barrett-dnsop-domain-set/). It
addresses the case John Klensin raised in the DAC thread, impersonation
look-alikes being mistaken for legitimate names. Having looked again, we
think it is distinct from DAC, RDBD and DBOUND in the following ways.

What domain-set does: an organization publishes the set of registrable
domains it wants recognized as its own, in any TLD, with relation types
(primary, operating, redirect, defensive). Each link counts as confirmed
only when both domains name each other and both directions are retrieved
over DNSSEC, or over HTTPS from the publisher's own domain. A consumer can
start from one name it trusts and retrieve the organization's whole set.

This is how domain-set differs from the others:

- From DAC: domain-set is for discovery, not a pairwise check. A consumer
gets the organization's full published set, not a yes/no answer about one
claimed link. The organization chooses what to include. Defensive
registrations such as misspellings usually don't resolve and can simply be
left out, so publishing a set doesn't mean disclosing a whole portfolio.

- From RDBD: no new RR types and no signature scheme, only TXT at an
underscored name. The linking mechanism is close to the simpler design John
Levine suggested on the dbound list in 2019, in place of RDBD's signatures:
each domain publishes a TXT record under an underscore label pointing at
the other. Links are never one-way: an assertion that the other side
doesn't return is reported only as "asserted" and must not be treated as
evidence. And a link has one defined meaning, common operation by the same
organization, not an unspecified relationship.

- From DBOUND: domain-set doesn't deal with policy boundaries within a
namespace, the cut points the PSL encodes for cookies, certificate
wildcards and DMARC. It neither replaces nor consults the PSL. It groups
unrelated sibling registrable domains under one organization, and only for
operators who choose to publish.

- From all three: domain-set is designed to carry independent verification.
It works for any organization with more than one public-facing domain, but
it is most useful when one member has been verified by a third party, such
as a registry that checks eligibility before issuing names. Early interest
has come mostly from organizations with names in .bank, .pharmacy, .brand
TLDs and ccTLDs that verify their registrants. These organizations often
run large portfolios in .com and other legacy TLDs. domain-set doesn't
perform that verification. It carries the verified identity, over confirmed
links, to the organization's other domains, so a consumer can tell a linked
domain from a look-alike with no link.

- Consumers: browsers and, increasingly, the AI assistants and agents that
people ask whether a site is the real one. They need a machine-readable
answer that the organization itself publishes.

In the next revision of domain-set we'll consider expanding the
related-work section to cite DAC, RDBD and DBOUND and set out these
differences in more detail. We'll post to the list when it's available. In
the meantime, comments here are welcome.

Tom Barrett
EnCirca, Inc.

-- 
Schedule a call with me.
https://calendar.app.google/BrESmtfgCG4tutSu7

Thomas Barrett
President
EnCirca, Inc
+1.781.942.9975 (office)
400 W. Cummings Park, Suite 1725
Woburn, MA 01801 USA
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