Draft: draft-wagope-dnsop-do-bit - "Clearing the DO bit for DNSSEC"
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wagope-dnsop-do-bit/>

Some of us were chatting at the recent ICANN meeting about impediments to
adoption of PQC algorithms in DNSSEC.

One of the big concerns is that PQC signatures will almost certainly
cause a fallback to TCP, and this may cause significant load issues for
both authoritative and recursive servers.

While only something like 40% of resolvers worldwide perform DNSSEC
validation, because of the way the DO bit works, all recursives request
this data, whether they need it or not.

This draft updates[0] RFC4034 - "Resource Records for the DNS Security
Extensions" <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4034/> to recommend that
recursive resolvers only set the DO bit if they, or their clients, are
validating.  This does mean that the resolver will need to track how the
data entered it's cache, and will have to additional queries if an incoming
query with DO arrives for an cache entry which was populated without DNSSEC
info. This trades complexity and additional queries for less TCP fallback.

The authors cannot figure out if this is the best idea ever, or the worst
idea ever, but we wanted to share it and get your feedback.

Warren, Peter and Geoff.
—
[0]: More correctly, this draft will be updated to update RFC4034 if the WG
decides that the idea is worth pursuing. I had some initial OLD / NEW text,
but I pulled it out to keep the initial version short and readable (and
because the draft-cutoff arrived faster than expected, and I didn't have
time to tidy it up more :-) )
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