> > The tension between draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-alg-rules and > > draft-jabley-dnsop-local-signing-algorithm-policy got me thinking. > > I don't think there is actually any fundamental tension between > these two drafts (or between local-signing-algorithm-policy and > RFC 4035). In fact, I think they are complimentary -- my draft > describes how a local policy that is not accommodated by 4035 or > multi-alg-rules is still possible, and how clients affected by that > local policy can be informed about it. The provision for local > policy to override the usual validation approach is mentioned > explicitly in RFC 4035 and I don't see that multi-alg-rules proposes > to remove it.
As far as I know, the following two statements are true: - with draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-alg-rules it is allowed to have a zone where some signers sign the zone with ECDSAP256SHA256 and other signers sign the zone with ECDSAP256SHA256 plus ML-DSA-44. - with draft-jabley-dnsop-local-signing-algorithm-policy, when a validator implements the policy described in the draft and receives an RRset signed with just ECDSAP256SHA256, it concludes DNSSEC bogus. That leads me to conclude that these two draft are in conflict: large scale implementation of one of these draft would make the other draft impossible because it would lead to DNSSEC bogus results. But maybe I'm wrong and I misunderstood the drafts. I support the goals of both drafs. It is just that as far as I can tell, as the drafts are written today, they cannot co-exist. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
