> Oh, I see what you mean, now. A response that only includes signatures
> from the P-256 signer would be identified as an attack by a validator
> that wants to protect against ML-DSA-44 signature stripping. Your
> ZSA idea also wouldn't help in this scenario: if an ML-DSA DNSKEY
> has ZSA=1 and one signer only signs with P-256 then the RRSIGs
> generated by that signer only will be insufficient for a validator
> that includes the ZSA logic.

This case ML-DSA DNSKEY records should have ZSA=0. 

> Presumably they can co-exist if zone administrators choose their
> signing algorithms appropriately and avoid the case where one signer
> doesn't sign with a PQ-safe algorithm while others do. Maybe this
is just a more general PQ consideration (as the sole case we care
> about today that has downgrade concerns) and not something that
> multi-alg-rules needs to care about.

The idea is that ZSA can be used to signal to the validator whether 
downgrade protection would work (ZSA=1 on at least on PQC DNSKEY) or
potentially break something (ZSA=0 on all PQC DNSKEYs)
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