Hi Ben, On 17 Nov 2026, at 21:03, Ben Schwartz <[email protected]> wrote:
>> (a) authentication of servers is not always trivial (nameservers often have >> many names; addresses can be subverted since the routing system is not >> strictly trustworthy); > > This authentication should be clearly defined via DELEG. (I assume > any discussion of authenticated ADoX is in reference to DELEG, as > there is no other active specification for this.) There are three: - RFC 9539 - draft-hoffman-deleg-secure-transports-00 - draft-johani-dnsop-transport-signaling-03 9539 uses port-knocking to find encrypted transport; draft-hoffman-deleg-secure-transports-00 uses signals published by zone owners in future delegations encoded using DELEG; draft-johani-dnsop-transport-signaling-03 uses signals published by nameserver operators. >> (b) unsigned data might have been modified on a secondary server, or in >> transit between primary and secondary > > In my view, DELEG should clearly specify that by making a nameserver > "authenticatable", the zone owner marks that nameserver as holding a > trustworthy copy of the zone. We could support the idea of an > "authenticated connection to an untrustworthy or vulnerable > nameserver", but I think this is a confusing and counterproductive > middle ground. This is a brand new concept, but in any case it's orthogonal to the topic at hand which is user privacy. >> (c) an insecure delegation from a parent cannot be trusted (the NS RRSet >> above the zone cut is unsigned) > > DELEG doesn't have this problem. > >> so the degree of integrity protection provided by DNSSEC and that provided >> by ADoX are not the same. > > I agree! But it can be quite a strong a form of authentication, and I > believe it may prove to be much more widely deployable than DNSSEC. You may well be right; I may well not disagree! But it's not what Leon's draft is about, unless I misunderstand its purpose. >>> If we intend to support >>> this arrangement, then I believe we should extend it with some signal >>> to indicate ADoX-based authentication. (We could even just overload >>> the AD bit, but I suspect that would not have consensus.) >> >> I'm not sure what ADoX-based authentication means, above. What would an >> authority server be signalling in a response to a recursive server by >> setting AD=1? > > I'm referring to an "AD2=1" signal from recursive to stub, meaning > "nothing in this response could have been poisoned on the path between > me and the authoritative servers". Isn't that what Leon's draft is trying to achieve in section 5.2, but with a richer signal? Joe _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
