On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 08:23:51PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
> From: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
> 
> Current CC designs don't place a vIOMMU in front of untrusted devices.
> Instead, the DMA API forces all untrusted device DMA through swiotlb
> bounce buffers (is_swiotlb_force_bounce()) which copies data into
> shared memory on behalf of the device.
> 
> When a caller has already arranged for the memory to be shared
> via set_memory_decrypted(), the DMA API needs to know so it can map
> directly using the unencrypted physical address rather than bounce
> buffering. Following the pattern of DMA_ATTR_MMIO, add
> DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED for this purpose. Like the MMIO case, only the
> caller knows what kind of memory it has and must inform the DMA API
> for it to work correctly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
> ---
> v4->v5:
> - rebased on top od dma-mapping-for-next
> - s/decrypted/shared/
> v3->v4:
> - added some sanity checks to dma_map_phys and dma_unmap_phys
> - enhanced documentation of DMA_ATTR_CC_DECRYPTED attr
> v1->v2:
> - rebased on top of recent dma-mapping-fixes
> ---
>  include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 10 ++++++++++
>  include/trace/events/dma.h  |  3 ++-
>  kernel/dma/direct.h         | 14 +++++++++++---
>  kernel/dma/mapping.c        | 13 +++++++++++--
>  4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>

Jason

Reply via email to