Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] dma-buf: unprivileged cgroup escape and OOM via dma_buf_xfer_charge() - [Medium] dma-buf: broken !CONFIG_MEMCG and disabled-memcg handling in dma_buf_xfer_charge() --
commit 3f75f95a079fdfc2b4d2659ae4dbea6726be45ad Author: Albert Esteve <[email protected]> dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE This commit adds the DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE ioctl and a generic mem_cgroup_transfer_charge() helper to transfer a dma-buf's memory cgroup charge to a target cgroup identified by a cgroupfd or pidfd. > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c > index 8376662735502..3bd26fbb11092 100644 > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c > @@ -540,6 +540,45 @@ static long dma_buf_import_sync_file(struct dma_buf > *dmabuf, > } > #endif > > +/* Transfer a dma-buf's memcg charge; see struct dma_buf_transfer_charge */ > +static long dma_buf_xfer_charge(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, > + const void __user *user_data) > +{ > + struct dma_buf_transfer_charge arg; > + struct mem_cgroup *memcg; > + unsigned int nr_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(dmabuf->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + int ret = 0; > + > + if (copy_from_user(&arg, user_data, sizeof(arg))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG)) > + return 0; [Severity: Medium] As reported by Sashiko on v3 [1], when CONFIG_MEMCG is disabled, dma_buf_xfer_charge() returns 0 before checking arg.flags, mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(arg.charge_fd), or dmabuf->memcg. On a CONFIG_MEMCG=n kernel, won't this accept non-zero arg.flags instead of returning -EINVAL, and return 0 instead of -EOPNOTSUPP on buffers that have no existing memcg charge? In include/uapi/linux/dma-buf.h, struct dma_buf_transfer_charge documents that flags must be zero and that the ioctl returns -EOPNOTSUPP if the buffer has no existing memcg charge. In include/linux/memcontrol.h, the !CONFIG_MEMCG stub for mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() already returns ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP): include/linux/memcontrol.h: static inline struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(int fd) { return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); } Returning 0 early here bypasses that stub and leaves the !CONFIG_MEMCG stub for mem_cgroup_transfer_charge() in include/linux/memcontrol.h unreachable. In addition, in mm/memcontrol.c, mem_cgroup_transfer_charge() has: if (!new_memcg || mem_cgroup_disabled()) return true; which returns true without updating *ptr_memcg or uncharging and dropping the reference to old_memcg, even though the function comment states that on success it stores new_memcg in *ptr_memcg. Should the early CONFIG_MEMCG check in dma_buf_xfer_charge() be dropped so it falls through to arg.flags validation and mem_cgroup_get_from_fd()? > + > + if (arg.flags != 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + memcg = mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(arg.charge_fd); > + if (IS_ERR(memcg)) > + return PTR_ERR(memcg); > + > + dma_resv_lock(dmabuf->resv, NULL); > + > + if (!dmabuf->memcg) { > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + goto out; > + } > + > + if (dmabuf->memcg != memcg && > + !mem_cgroup_transfer_charge(&dmabuf->memcg, memcg, MEMCG_DMABUF, > nr_pages)) > + ret = -ENOMEM; [Severity: High] As reported by Sashiko on v3 [2], can an unprivileged holder of a dma-buf file descriptor use dma_buf_xfer_charge() to escape its own memory cgroup limits or trigger reclaim and OOM kills in another cgroup? In dma_buf_ioctl() -> dma_buf_xfer_charge() -> mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(), neither dma_buf_xfer_charge() nor mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() checks DAC permissions, capabilities (such as CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN), cgroup v2 write/delegation permissions (such as cgroup_procs_write_permission() used by CLONE_INTO_CGROUP), or task access permissions (such as ptrace_may_access()) on either the source cgroup (dmabuf->memcg) or the target cgroup/task (memcg): mm/memcontrol.c:mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() { cgrp = cgroup_get_from_fd(fd); if (!IS_ERR(cgrp)) { ... return memcg; } task = pidfd_get_task(fd, &pidfd_flags); ... } Because /sys/fs/cgroup directories are world-readable (0755) by default and pidfd_open() requires no privileges for visible PIDs, any unprivileged process can open /sys/fs/cgroup (root_mem_cgroup) or another cgroup's directory or pidfd. Even with the subsequent LSM and SELinux patches in this series: 1. On systems without SELinux (such as AppArmor, Smack, or CONFIG_SECURITY=n), security_dma_buf_charge_cgroup() and security_dma_buf_charge_task() return 0 with no baseline DAC, cgroup permission, or capability checks. 2. On SELinux systems, selinux_dma_buf_charge_cgroup() checks kernfs_xattr_get(cgrp->kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0) and returns 0 on -ENODATA whenever a cgroup directory lacks an explicit security.selinux xattr (including /sys/fs/cgroup and cgroups labeled via default genfscon policy rules). 3. Neither dma_buf_xfer_charge() nor the LSM hooks check whether the caller is authorized to uncharge the source cgroup (dmabuf->memcg). When mem_cgroup_transfer_charge() runs: mm/memcontrol.c:mem_cgroup_transfer_charge() { ... if (try_charge(new_memcg, GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages)) return false; ... if (old_memcg) { /* Uncharge old cgroup */ mod_memcg_state(old_memcg, item, -nr_pages); if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(old_memcg)) refill_stock(old_memcg, nr_pages); mem_cgroup_put(old_memcg); } } A confined process can pass an fd for /sys/fs/cgroup (where try_charge() on root_mem_cgroup is a no-op) to uncharge its own cgroup and bypass memory.max, or pass an fd for another cgroup to trigger GFP_KERNEL direct reclaim and mem_cgroup_oom() in that victim cgroup. Should dma_buf_xfer_charge() or mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() enforce baseline cgroup write/task permissions and authorization to uncharge dmabuf->memcg? [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261027-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v3-7-78d2c4cb8...@redhat.com [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261027-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v3-7-78d2c4cb8...@redhat.com -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261104-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v4-0-1819a0170...@redhat.com?part=3
