On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 10:09:35AM +0000, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
> Cc Michael Roth, Alexey, Pankaj Gupta
> 
> On 16/11/2026 09:11, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:
> > 
> > This series tightens the alignment requirements for buffers that are shared
> > between confidential-computing guests and the host, and adds a common
> > allocator for host-shared memory.
> > 
> > When a guest runs with private memory, buffers shared with the hypervisor
> > are not only accessed by the guest. They are also accessed by the host
> > kernel, and the host may manage the corresponding shared/private state at a
> > granularity larger than the guest page size.
> > 
> > Architectures such as Arm can detect incorrect accesses to Realm physical
> > address space PFNs through GPC faults. However, relying on that as the only
> > line of defence is fragile and can still lead to kernel crashes. The risk
> > is especially visible for shared buffers that are later mmapped into
> > userspace, such as guest_memfd or dma-buf backed allocations. Once
> > userspace can access the mapping, the kernel cannot guarantee that
> > applications will only touch the intended 4K region rather than the whole
> > host page mapped into their address space. Those userspace addresses may
> > also be passed back into the kernel and accessed through the linear map,
> > resulting in a GPC fault.
> 
> IIUC, AMD SEV-SNP also has a similar requirement for other reasons, to
> align the "shared" allocations within a guest (2MB ?, as mentioned by
> David Kaplan at the LPC).
> 
> Michael, Alexey,
> 
> Please could you share your thoughts on this series ?

Yes, I think we concluded at LPC that AMD should use this series with
a 2MB setting rather than try to do their HW assisted smash/unsmash

Jason

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