At 10:36 AM 7/6/2001 -0400, Craig Spencer wrote:
>Julian Morrison wrote:
>
> > a) If you do business with unidentified people, you can be dragged into
> > their crimes, you can be swindled, and you can help crime in general
> > prosper.
>
>Strictly speaking the problem is not that they are unidentified. It is
>that they are criminals. Identification may filter out some of the
>criminals but it does not filter out all of them and it interferes
>with some perfectly legitimate business.
>
> > b) If you force identity and audit trail of all people, you leave people
> > no way to bypass pseudocrimes such as being unwilling to be bled white
> > by elected thieves. Plus you have to raise your prices to cover the
> > workload of playing detective over every transaction.
>
>Right.
>
> > The main problem with (a) assuming you're smart enough not to buy into a
> > scam is that of unidirectional anonymity. They know and can tell that
> > they dealt with you; you don't know them from Adam.
>
>I don't see why unidirectional anonymity *per se* is a problem. Unless
>you mean it allows the innocent, identified party to be scapegoated for
>the crimes of the unknown. ???
>
> > So the solution
> > focusing on (a) is *bidirectional anonymity*. For example an automated
> > MM system that matches "want to buy" against "want to sell" in such a
> > way as to make an audit trail impossible.
>
>That would be a good business. But I don't see it as addressing the
>crime problem.
>
> > The problem with (b) comes in two parts: first, the state requiring you
> > to prevent pseudocrimes, second the waste of time and effort. To the
> > first part, the solution is validated pseudonymous reputation. To the
> > second, an external service providing reputation services. You only deal
> > through them, and so you can evaluate the trustworthiness of a mask
> > without being required to inform on its wearer.
>
>I think this is a good and promising idea. But I am not sure it is a
>complete solution. It would have to be tried and its consequences
>observed.
>
>For this end I have in the past made the following suggestion to a few
>persons on this list. Establish a functioning PGP path server and sell
>access to its services. [I lack the means, both financial and
>intellectual, to do this myself.] MMs or whoever could use this tool in
>many ways of their own devising to verify nymous reputation.
>
>A path server is somewhat like existing key servers but finds and
>provides
>endorsement paths between PGP keys. There have been path servers in
>operation in the past
> http://www.rubin.ch/pgp/pathserver
>but they seem to have gone defunct.
How about http://dtype.org/keyanalyze/
steve
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