The interesting Hettinga-message below evokes bank-runs, but
(unlike the media) I doubt I'd have ever called Mr. Lay any sort of
crusader for free markets. IMNSHO, "political bigwig" was a more
accurate description, but of course, I often (accurately) describe
things in ways the "mainstream" media won't. I liked seeing 
http://www.satirewire.com/news/0111/enron.shtml though I can't
classify satireware as very "mainstream." :^)
JMR

Subject: A Big Fall Evoking Nasty Old Memories of a Run on a Bank
From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 09:11:06 -0500

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/business/29PLAC.html?todaysheadlines=&pagewanted=print


November 29, 2001

A Big Fall Evoking Nasty Old Memories of a Run on a Bank

By FLOYD NORRIS

The final collapse of Enron (news/quote) amounted to something that few
living Americans have ever seen: a bank run like those in the days before
deposit insurance.

Enron appeared to become a wildly successful company by creating a new,
largely unregulated financial business, that of energy trading. That
business ran on credit, and required suppliers and users of energy to sign
contracts that called on Enron to meet obligations months or years later.

Enron became something like a bank, which takes depositors' money and
promises to pay it back later. But unlike banks in the current era, this
institution had no federal deposit insurance to reassure customers when
rumors began to spread that it was in trouble. That proved to be its
Achilles' heel. Enron's collapse is a reminder for big players in
unregulated markets that their financial health must be beyond doubt.

Before the advent of deposit insurance, bankers knew what was needed to
head off a bank run. It was cash, so much cash that it would be clear that
panic was unwarranted. Nearly a century ago, J. P. Morgan took the lead as
he and fellow banking tycoons put up the millions needed to keep the Trust
Company of America open. Thus was halted the Panic of 1907.

As it happened, corporate descendants of two major institutions involved in
that rescue - J. P. Morgan Chase (news/quote) and Citigroup (news/quote) -
were major players in the Enron debacle. But they did not try the strategy
this time.

Instead, Enron kept arranging an additional billion or two in loans,
clearly struggling to find the money. Morgan and Citigroup allowed the word
to spread that they were ready to put in more money on their own, but the
amounts were relatively small, and somehow the money was never invested.

When Dynegy (news/quote) agreed to buy Enron, it put up $1.5 billion in
cash only after it was assured that it would get control of the company's
crown jewel, the Northern Natural Gas pipeline system, or its money back,
if the deal collapsed.

The final straw came on Tuesday, when negotiations on a revised Dynegy
takeover deal came down to efforts to find $250 million or $500 million of
Enron assets that could serve as collateral for a new Dynegy cash advance.
The message to companies that traded with Enron was clear: even its rescuer
is demanding collateral, and is having trouble finding it.

Given that, Enron's financial business could not continue. Public haggling
over the terms of the rescue assured that no rescue was possible, something
that would have been obvious to the original J. P. Morgan but that seemed
to escape his corporate heirs. As Walter Bagehot, the British financial
journalist and historian, wrote in 1873, "Every banker knows that if he has
to prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his arguments, in
fact his credit is gone."

The markets Enron helped to create will endure, but probably without Enron.
It will be interesting to see whether participants in them continue to
resist regulation as much as they have in the past. Unregulated markets,
especially when they are relatively new, can be very profitable for those
with superior market knowledge, as Enron seemed to have. But when prices
are visible to all, the value of that knowledge plummets. Regulation could
bring more openness, but it could also bring structures, like clearing
systems, that reassure traders they need not worry about the credit of
those with whom they trade.

If the markets continue to be unregulated, Enron's collapse makes it more
likely that the big players in those markets will be companies that are
already regulated enough to assure customers that they are secure -
companies like major banks and brokerage houses. That would be bad news for
Dynegy, which was Enron's major competitor before it tried to become its
acquirer.

The crisis at Enron may have exposed a "flaw in the business model" of
energy trading companies, said John Diaz, a managing director at Moody's
(news/quote), in an interview yesterday. "Companies in this industry need
to think carefully about their liquidity management," he said. "We're going
to be looking very hard at this."

The litigation over Enron seems likely to be prolonged and expensive, but
it may boil down to Senator Howard H. Baker Jr.'s famous Watergate-era
question about President Richard M. Nixon: What did he know and when did he
know it?

That question will be asked about Arthur Andersen, Enron's auditor, and
about its corporate officials, past and present. But it will be asked most
particularly about the banks and investment banks that served Enron and its
affiliated off-balance- sheet entities in recent years.

Enron's disclosures last week showed it needed to pay far more in debts
over the next year than most people had understood to be the case. But the
newly discovered loans did not materialize out of thin air. The money was
lent by banks and bond buyers to the off-balance-sheet entities. Those who
were stuck with losses on the known Enron debt may claim the financiers who
syndicated the loans should have told them of all the other debt.

Among those who do not come out of this looking very good are the bond
rating agencies. Just six weeks ago, after Enron put out an earnings
release showing strong pro-forma profits, as it defined them, two of the
agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor's, reaffirmed Enron's rating of
triple-B plus. Moody's, the agency that was the most skeptical about Enron,
put the rating under review and hinted it would, at worst, cut it one notch.

None of the rating agencies seemed overly concerned about a detail
disclosed by Enron at the time: a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder
equity related to what it later said were accounting mistakes involving a
partnership run by Enron's chief financial officer. But that disclosure set
off a cascade of questions that Enron could not answer in a reassuring way.
It ran through billions as companies demanded more protection to keep
trading with it.

Enron could have been saved, if an institution that was trusted - whether
that was Chevron (news/quote) Texaco (news/quote), which put up the $1.5
billion cash that Dynegy invested, or J. P. Morgan Chase or Citigroup - had
made it clear that it was willing to stand behind Enron. A credible backer
would have ended the run.

But no one was willing to do that, and their hesitance as they learned more
only accelerated the run. Whether they were wise to avoid that exposure may
become clear as it emerges how much creditors will eventually get.

Finally, the rating agencies yesterday downgraded Enron to relatively low
levels of junk. They knew that was likely to force Enron into bankruptcy in
the near future, but they also knew that no one was willing to rescue a
company that the agencies had viewed as solid only weeks before.

Yesterday, as Dynegy walked away from the merger, it said that it was no
longer willing to trade with Enron - unless Enron put up "sufficient credit
support." It knew that support was nowhere to be found.

Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'


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