He.. he.. he...! Kalau nga salah, ini namanya dagelan jin Mas... Jadi ingat cerita Adam dan Hawa yang ketipu setan... Kacian jika nanti muncul orang-orang yang memprotes sekolah-sekolah ekonomi... Lalu menyuruh cabut gelar Es Es-annya para "pakar"nya karena mengimani teori palsu... Mudah-mudahan saja tidak terjadi begitu... Semoga...
Salam Z On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 4:31 PM, sidqy suyitno <sidqy_suyi...@yahoo.com>wrote: > December 22, 2008 > http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/12/the_theory_of_market_equilibri.html > The Theory of Market Equilibrium Is Wrong > > *By* *George Soros* > > *We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. The > salient feature of the crisis is that it was not caused by some external > shock like OPEC raising the price of oil. It was generated by the financial > system itself. This fact - a defect inherent in the system - contradicts the > generally accepted theory that financial markets tend toward equilibrium and > deviations from the equilibrium occur either in a random manner or are > caused by some sudden external event to which markets have difficulty in > adjusting. The current approach to market regulation has been based on this > theory, but the severity and amplitude of the crisis proves convincingly > that there is something fundamentally wrong with it.* > > We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. The > salient feature of the crisis is that it was not caused by some external > shock like OPEC raising the price of oil. It was generated by the financial > system itself. This fact - a defect inherent in the system - contradicts the > generally accepted theory that financial markets tend toward equilibrium and > deviations from the equilibrium occur either in a random manner or are > caused by some sudden external event to which markets have difficulty in > adjusting. The current approach to market regulation has been based on this > theory, but the severity and amplitude of the crisis proves convincingly > that there is something fundamentally wrong with it. > > I have developed an alternative theory which holds that financial markets > do not reflect the underlying conditions accurately. They provide a picture > that is always biased or distorted in some way or another. More importantly, > the distorted views held by market participants and expressed in market > prices can, under certain circumstances, affect the so-called fundamentals > that market prices are supposed to reflect. > > I call this two-way circular connection between market prices and the > underlying reality "reflexivity." I contend that financial markets are > always reflexive and on occasion they can veer quite far away from the > so-called equilibrium. In other words, financial markets are prone to > producing bubbles. > > The current crisis originated in the subprime mortgage market. The bursting > of the US housing bubble acted as a detonator that exploded a much larger > super-bubble that started developing in the 1980s when market fundamentalism > became the dominant creed. That creed led to deregulation, globalization, > and financial innovations based on the false assumption that markets tend > toward equilibrium. > > The house of cards has now collapsed. With the bankruptcy of Lehman > Brothers in September 2008, the inconceivable happened: The financial system > went into cardiac arrest. It was immediately put on artificial respiration: > The authorities in the developed world effectively guaranteed that no other > important institution would be allowed to fail. > > But countries at the periphery of the global financial system could not > provide equally credible guarantees. This precipitated capital flight from > countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. All currencies fell > against the dollar and the yen. Commodity prices dropped like a stone, and > interest rates in emerging markets soared. > > The race to save the international financial system is still in progress. > Even if it is successful, consumers, investors, and businesses are > undergoing a traumatic experience whose full impact is yet to be felt. A > deep recession is inevitable and the possibility of a depression cannot be > ruled out. > > So what is to be done? > > Because financial markets are prone to creating asset bubbles, regulators > must accept responsibility for preventing them from growing too big. Until > now, financial authorities have explicitly rejected that responsibility. > > Of course, it is impossible to prevent bubbles from forming, but it should > be possible to keep them within tolerable bounds. This cannot be done simply > by controlling the money supply. Regulators must also take into account > credit conditions, because money and credit do not move in lockstep. Markets > have moods and biases, which need to be counterbalanced. To control credit > as distinct from money, additional tools must be employed - or, more > accurately, reactivated, since they were used in the 1950s and 1960s. I > refer to varying margin requirements and the minimal capital requirements of > banks. > > Today's sophisticated financial engineering can render the calculation of > margin and capital requirements extremely difficult, if not impossible. > Therefore new financial products must be registered and approved by the > appropriate authorities before being sold. > > Counterbalancing the mood of the market requires judgment, and because > regulators are human, they are bound to get it wrong. They have the > advantage, however, of getting feedback from the market, which should enable > them to correct their mistakes. If a tightening of margin and minimum > capital requirements does not deflate a bubble, regulators can tighten some > more. But the process is not foolproof, because markets can also be wrong. > The search for the optimum equilibrium is a never-ending process of trial > and error. > > This cat-and-mouse game between regulators and market participants is > already ongoing, but its true nature has not yet been acknowledged. Alan > Greenspan, the former US Federal Reserve chairman, was a master of > manipulation with his Delphic utterances, but instead of acknowledging what > he was doing, he pretended that he was merely a passive observer. That is > why asset bubbles could grow so large during his tenure. > > Because financial markets are global, regulations must also be > international in scope. In the current situation, the International Monetary > Fund (IMF) has a new mission in life: to protect the periphery countries > against the effects of storms that originate at the center, namely the United > States. > > The US consumer can no longer serve as the motor of the world economy. To > avoid a global depression other countries must also stimulate their domestic > economies. But periphery countries without large export surpluses are not in > a position to employ countercyclical policies. It is up to the IMF to find > ways to finance countercyclical fiscal deficits. This could be done partly > by enlisting sovereign wealth funds and partly by issuing Special Drawing > Rights so that rich countries that can finance their own fiscal deficits > could cede to poorer countries that cannot. > > While international regulation must be strengthened for the global > financial system to survive we must also beware of going too far. Markets > are imperfect but regulations are even more so. Regulators are not only > human; they are also bureaucratic and subject to political influences. > Regulations should be kept to the minimum necessary to maintain stability. > > *** George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management.* > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
