Wah dari pembuat masalah, George Soros kok sekarang tampil jadi jagoan. Equilibrium tuh ada, cuman tidak bisa dicapai:-) Lawong di dunia nyata tuh tidak ada cateris paribus kok, makanya kondisi-kondisi equilibrium tuh nggak bisa dicapai, karena proses menujunya akan selalu terganggu. Gambaran tentang adanya kondisi equilibrium bisa dirasakan kalau kita belajar misalnya ECM atau PAM.
Solusinya, kita harus masuk ke bidang ilmu ekonomi aktif bukan yang evaluatif. Kunci ilmu ekonomi aktif adalah rekayasa perilaku ekonomi atas dasar paradigma terpilih tertentu - misalnya Islam. Selama ini pakar-pakar ekonomi kita bermain-main saja di bidang ilmu ekonomi evaluatif, kerjanya merespon-respon saja masalah-masalah yang aktif dilahirkan dalang-dalang kapitalisme. Contohnya, kita bisa saja melatih masyarakat untuk tidak berperilaku atas dasar bunga, tapi mana ada pakar ekonomi kita yang mau begitu? Salam hangat B. Samparan --- On Sat, 1/3/09, Harlizon MBAu <harli...@gmail.com> wrote: > From: Harlizon MBAu <harli...@gmail.com> > Subject: [ekonomi-nasional] Re: [indonesia] Soros: The Theory of Market > Equilibrium Is Wrong > To: indone...@nextbetter.net > Cc: sidqy_suyi...@yahoo.com, ekonomi-nasional@yahoogroups.com > Date: Saturday, January 3, 2009, 2:30 AM > He.. he.. he...! > Kalau nga salah, ini namanya dagelan jin Mas... > Jadi ingat cerita Adam dan Hawa yang ketipu setan... > Kacian jika nanti muncul orang-orang yang memprotes > sekolah-sekolah > ekonomi... > Lalu menyuruh cabut gelar Es Es-annya para > "pakar"nya karena mengimani teori > palsu... > Mudah-mudahan saja tidak terjadi begitu... > Semoga... > > Salam Z > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 4:31 PM, sidqy suyitno > <sidqy_suyi...@yahoo.com>wrote: > > > December 22, 2008 > > > http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/12/the_theory_of_market_equilibri.html > > The Theory of Market Equilibrium Is Wrong > > > > *By* *George Soros* > > > > *We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis > since the 1930s. The > > salient feature of the crisis is that it was not > caused by some external > > shock like OPEC raising the price of oil. It was > generated by the financial > > system itself. This fact - a defect inherent in the > system - contradicts the > > generally accepted theory that financial markets tend > toward equilibrium and > > deviations from the equilibrium occur either in a > random manner or are > > caused by some sudden external event to which markets > have difficulty in > > adjusting. The current approach to market regulation > has been based on this > > theory, but the severity and amplitude of the crisis > proves convincingly > > that there is something fundamentally wrong with it.* > > > > We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis > since the 1930s. The > > salient feature of the crisis is that it was not > caused by some external > > shock like OPEC raising the price of oil. It was > generated by the financial > > system itself. This fact - a defect inherent in the > system - contradicts the > > generally accepted theory that financial markets tend > toward equilibrium and > > deviations from the equilibrium occur either in a > random manner or are > > caused by some sudden external event to which markets > have difficulty in > > adjusting. The current approach to market regulation > has been based on this > > theory, but the severity and amplitude of the crisis > proves convincingly > > that there is something fundamentally wrong with it. > > > > I have developed an alternative theory which holds > that financial markets > > do not reflect the underlying conditions accurately. > They provide a picture > > that is always biased or distorted in some way or > another. More importantly, > > the distorted views held by market participants and > expressed in market > > prices can, under certain circumstances, affect the > so-called fundamentals > > that market prices are supposed to reflect. > > > > I call this two-way circular connection between market > prices and the > > underlying reality "reflexivity." I contend > that financial markets are > > always reflexive and on occasion they can veer quite > far away from the > > so-called equilibrium. In other words, financial > markets are prone to > > producing bubbles. > > > > The current crisis originated in the subprime mortgage > market. The bursting > > of the US housing bubble acted as a detonator that > exploded a much larger > > super-bubble that started developing in the 1980s when > market fundamentalism > > became the dominant creed. That creed led to > deregulation, globalization, > > and financial innovations based on the false > assumption that markets tend > > toward equilibrium. > > > > The house of cards has now collapsed. With the > bankruptcy of Lehman > > Brothers in September 2008, the inconceivable > happened: The financial system > > went into cardiac arrest. It was immediately put on > artificial respiration: > > The authorities in the developed world effectively > guaranteed that no other > > important institution would be allowed to fail. > > > > But countries at the periphery of the global financial > system could not > > provide equally credible guarantees. This precipitated > capital flight from > > countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. > All currencies fell > > against the dollar and the yen. Commodity prices > dropped like a stone, and > > interest rates in emerging markets soared. > > > > The race to save the international financial system is > still in progress. > > Even if it is successful, consumers, investors, and > businesses are > > undergoing a traumatic experience whose full impact is > yet to be felt. A > > deep recession is inevitable and the possibility of a > depression cannot be > > ruled out. > > > > So what is to be done? > > > > Because financial markets are prone to creating asset > bubbles, regulators > > must accept responsibility for preventing them from > growing too big. Until > > now, financial authorities have explicitly rejected > that responsibility. > > > > Of course, it is impossible to prevent bubbles from > forming, but it should > > be possible to keep them within tolerable bounds. This > cannot be done simply > > by controlling the money supply. Regulators must also > take into account > > credit conditions, because money and credit do not > move in lockstep. Markets > > have moods and biases, which need to be > counterbalanced. To control credit > > as distinct from money, additional tools must be > employed - or, more > > accurately, reactivated, since they were used in the > 1950s and 1960s. I > > refer to varying margin requirements and the minimal > capital requirements of > > banks. > > > > Today's sophisticated financial engineering can > render the calculation of > > margin and capital requirements extremely difficult, > if not impossible. > > Therefore new financial products must be registered > and approved by the > > appropriate authorities before being sold. > > > > Counterbalancing the mood of the market requires > judgment, and because > > regulators are human, they are bound to get it wrong. > They have the > > advantage, however, of getting feedback from the > market, which should enable > > them to correct their mistakes. If a tightening of > margin and minimum > > capital requirements does not deflate a bubble, > regulators can tighten some > > more. But the process is not foolproof, because > markets can also be wrong. > > The search for the optimum equilibrium is a > never-ending process of trial > > and error. > > > > This cat-and-mouse game between regulators and market > participants is > > already ongoing, but its true nature has not yet been > acknowledged. Alan > > Greenspan, the former US Federal Reserve chairman, was > a master of > > manipulation with his Delphic utterances, but instead > of acknowledging what > > he was doing, he pretended that he was merely a > passive observer. That is > > why asset bubbles could grow so large during his > tenure. > > > > Because financial markets are global, regulations must > also be > > international in scope. In the current situation, the > International Monetary > > Fund (IMF) has a new mission in life: to protect the > periphery countries > > against the effects of storms that originate at the > center, namely the United > > States. > > > > The US consumer can no longer serve as the motor of > the world economy. To > > avoid a global depression other countries must also > stimulate their domestic > > economies. But periphery countries without large > export surpluses are not in > > a position to employ countercyclical policies. It is > up to the IMF to find > > ways to finance countercyclical fiscal deficits. This > could be done partly > > by enlisting sovereign wealth funds and partly by > issuing Special Drawing > > Rights so that rich countries that can finance their > own fiscal deficits > > could cede to poorer countries that cannot. > > > > While international regulation must be strengthened > for the global > > financial system to survive we must also beware of > going too far. Markets > > are imperfect but regulations are even more so. > Regulators are not only > > human; they are also bureaucratic and subject to > political influences. > > Regulations should be kept to the minimum necessary to > maintain stability. > > > > *** George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund > Management.* > > > > > > > > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
