--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > MCA is also more likely to elect A in this scenario. The A>B>C faction > can safely rate A preferred and B acceptable, unless they believe a > majority of the electorate is rating both B and C as preferred. So while > MCA is not completely immune to manipulation of polls (is anything?), it's > certainly more robust than some methods.
Looks that way. A supporters who think A could have a majority might even disapprove B. However, if they think C might have a majority of "preferred" ratings, they might bump B up to "preferred" along with A. This scenario seems more likely than what you envisioned. > Also, can somebody remind me what the "Turkey Problem" is? This thread > has been going on for a while. I seem to recall it having something to do > with a candidate winning even though a lot of people didn't really like > him that much. It's just what you say. The context was specifically Condorcet. I think the topic is dead, though, unless someone has something new to add... > Alex > Forest Simmons said: > > See the full text of message 10396 for further analysis showing that > > Borda and IRV are also apt to give B the win in this context, while > > Condorcet and Candidate Proxy are almost sure to elicit more sincere > > votes and give the win to A. That's a great post. Thought-provoking. I want to consider the case with three-rank Conditional Approval (of interest only to me, perhaps): Sincere: 6000 A>>B>C 3000 C>B>>A 1000 B>C>>A False poll: 35% A>B>C 40% C>B>A 25% B>C>A Believing these poll results, the A supporters have no reason not to vote A|B|C. Why? They only end up supporting B if C takes the lead. They don't risk keeping A from beating B in this way, because they don't believe any of the B/C voters are willing to compromise on A. So the thought is, if C leads, A is no longer viable, so why not support B. The strategy of B and C voters is more complicated, but it doesn't make a difference in the outcome. The results would be: 6000 A|B|C 3000 C|B|A or C||BA 1000 B|C|A or B||CA A is the initial leader in any case. In response, B and C can't get any more than 4000 votes total. Thus A remains the leader and wins. Question: What advantage does MCA have over three-rank Condorcet? Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
