On Thu, 12 Jun 2003, Forest Simmons wrote: > Indeed artificial ballot constraints tend to elicit insincere ballots.
Note how Approval shines in this regard: An Approval ballot may be considered as an unconstrained plurality ballot. At a more subtle level Approval may be considered a CR ballot in which all votes are constrained to the extremes of the ratings range. But it turns out that this constraint is not artificial since it precisely conforms to the dictates of optimal CR strategy regardless of the amount of information available. Note, however, that there are other uses for CR ballots than the standard CR method of giving the win to the candidate with the highest average rating. In some of these other uses, including approval runoff, constraining to the extremes is not in general consistent with optimal strategy. In this context this constraint would be almost as artificial as the IRV and Coombs constraints. Forest ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
