Kevin Venzke wrote: > I wonder if BE's result in such cases is just erratic and senseless, or > if there's a reasoning behind it.
If by Borda-Elimination you mean repeatedly eliminating the candidate with the smallest Borda score (which I call Baldwin), there's a reasoning behind it. A Condorcet winner always has an above-average Borda score. This is easy to see when you calculate the Borda score the way I do: look at the raw pairwise matrix and subtract a candidate's column sum from its row sum. If a candidate wins each pairwise matchup, that score will always be positive, and the sum of all Borda scores is zero, so a Condorcet winner's Borda score is always above average. Therefore it won't be eliminated at any stage of Baldwin or Nanson, so Baldwin and Nanson are Condorcet methods. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
