The moral of Rob's example below is that PR should not be done by sequential choice.
That's why PAV is superior to sequential PAV, for another example. Since STV is a sequential choice method, it is essentially a bailing wire and string kluge that may be good enough for government work, but should be avoided in serious applications. Forest On Fri, 22 Aug 2003, Rob LeGrand wrote: > John B. Hodges wrote: > > CPO-STV is an awesome multiseat method, conceptually. I'm wondering > > if there is a computationally efficient way of arriving at the same > > "ideal" ensemble. My "For Dummies" guess is that the ideal ensemble > > will never include a Condorcet loser and will always include a > > Condorcet-winner if one exists. STV with Rob's "orphan" elimination > > rule would (I guess) be sufficient to do that much. > > I'm not sure I agree that the ideal ensemble should always include a > Condorcet winner and exclude a Condorcet loser. For example, if we're > electing two winners from three candidates and the preferences are > > 45:Reagan>Anderson>Carter > 20:Anderson>Carter>Reagan > 35:Carter>Anderson>Reagan > > I would argue that the outcome {Reagan, Carter} is the most proportionally > representative. In a sense, the Reagan-first voters' preference for > Anderson over Carter *should* be ignored since they already got their first > choice in Reagan. (Would anyone disagree with that? Is there a good > argument for preferring the outcome {Carter, Anderson}?) So this "ideal > ensemble" includes the Condorcet loser (Reagan) and excludes the Condorcet > winner (Anderson). > > The moral here is that single-winner and multiwinner elections are quite > different. While the best single-winner methods can concentrate on > limiting insincere voting without worrying about proportionality, the best > multiwinner methods must strike a balance between striving for good > proportionality and discouraging insincerity. > > I think of a spectrum with single-winner systems at one end and something > like Direct Representation (http://www.directrep.org/) at the other. > Strewn in the middle are n-winner systems. Somewhat paradoxically, "vote > for any number of candidates" (Approval) is best for the single-winner case > and "vote for only one candidate" (SNTV) becomes best for the n-winner case > as n increases. Approval is great at removing insincerity from strategy > but gives poor proportionality (which is irrelevant in the single-winner > case), while SNTV often encourages insincerity (though less and less as n > increases) but gives good proportionality (which improves as n increases). > So it's not obvious to me that the best multiwinner systems reduce in the > single-winner case to the best single-winner systems. > > ===== > Rob LeGrand, psephologist > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Citizens for Approval Voting > http://www.approvalvoting.org/ > > __________________________________ > Do you Yahoo!? > Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software > http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info