There is a way to assign a number to every candidate at the end of a Condorcet process but I am not sure it would fit your need. To be precise that procedure finally assigns every vote to the voter's favorite candidate among the acceptable candidates. It is clearly not a proportional ending but I do not think you aim for multiple-winners elections using multiple seat circumscription, so maybe it fits your needs.
This would be called Condorcet using sequential dropping and residual approval weights. Saddly(?) the website I posted this model is gone but I can send it back to you and you could find somewhere in electorama's archives (date 16/10/02) more details and other versions... Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon a écrit : > Objet: > [EM] J)Ranked pairs using relative margins, sequential > dropping... > Renvoyé-Date: > Wed, 16 Oct 2002 00:14:08 -0700 > Renvoyé-De: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: > Wed, 16 Oct 2002 03:14:01 -0400 > De: > Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Société: > Solutions 3000 > A: > Election Methods List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > ...and residual approval weights > > Summary: > > This method is like the previous one (K) excepted that the elimination > order is definer by a ranked pair path instead of the number of 1st > preference votes. It mixes IRV, Ranked Pairs and Approval methods. > > Explanation: > > The input is Demorep's preferential and > approval ballot. We use ? to represent > unranked candidates. Using the election-methods-list > notation, we will use >> to indicate the approval > limit. > So acceptable candidates >> unacceptable candidates. > For example: A > C > E >> D > B. > We apply ranked pairs with relative margin. > In case of equality, each ranking scenario is done, > the final result is the average of the scenarios (well weighted). > When the last candidate is eliminated, we check what is his residual > approval rating. He receives one residual weight for each ballot where > he is the last active candidate higher than >>. Elimination should not > modify the ranked pair order. > If the approval limit >> is not mentionned we suppose it could be > added at the end. The winner is the candidate with the highest > approval rating, not necessarily the latest eliminated. > > Example: > > 26: A > E > B >> C ? D > 25: B > E >> A ? C ? D > 24: >> C > E > A = B ? D (None ballots with lesser evil details) > 23: D > E >> A ? B ? C > 1: E >> A ? B ? C ? D > 1: A ? B ? C ? D ? E (Blank ballot, a none ballot would start by >>) > Locking produces: > E>D (53/99) > E>C (51/99) > E>B (49/99) > E>A (47/99) > B>C (27/75) > A>D (3/49) > B>D (2/48) > A>C (2/50) > C>D (1/47) > A>B (1/75) > Resulting ranking: E > A > B > C > D. > Elimination produces the weights: > D => 0 residual approval. > C => 0 residual approval. > B => 0 residual approval. > A => 0 residual approval. > E => 75 residual approval. > and 24 none ballots and 1 blank ballot. > Final ranking: E(75) > A = B = C = D (0) > E wins. > > Advantages: > > The method does not encourage cloning. > Trying to identify a lesser of two evil cannot help elect it. > The method has weights as output so it can be incorporated > into a fully proportional multiple-winners method. > None and blank ballots can be differenciated, so they could have > different consequences in a multiple-winners method. > This methods guarantees the election of a Condorcet winner > if it exists and is approved by all ballots. > It resists well against vote-splitting because it is pairwise > comparison based. > > Disadvantages: > > It is not monotonic. > > Previous explanations: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Electoral_systems_designers/message/77 > > Steph. > > ---- > For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), > please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em Rob Brown a écrit : > Hi all, > > I have lurked on this list on and off for a few years (the whole Nader > thing in 2000 really got me interested in how thorougly broken plurality > systems are). Now I'm working on a web-based Condorcet based election > system, so I figured I'd drop in and introduce myself, and see if anyone > has any thoughts on the issue I'm having. > > I'm a programmer (c/c++/java/javascript) with an industrial design > background, so I tend to be big on UI and graphical stuff. I have also > dabbled in fuzzy logic, collaborative filtering, people matching and the > like for a good while. > > Here is a UI I am working on for doing for ranking > candidates: http://weblogz.com/voting/2000pres.html > This demo is of course based on the 2000 presidential election, and allows > > you to rank candidates with a (hopefully) friendly UI. I avoided having > people manually assign numbers to candidates (after all, they are sitting > > in front of a perfectly good computer which can do that sort of thing > well!), and I tried using a little animation, which seems to help in > making > it easy for voters to follow what they are doing. > > On the back end, I don't have any problem with figuring out how to > tabulate > the results, in terms of who is the first choice, who is the second, etc. > I > am using the Condorcet method, and using ranked pairs to break ties. No > problem there.... > > Now I need to figure out how to display results, in a way that makes sense > > to people. The people I have talked to who are likely to use this system > want to see more information beyond just the final ranking of candidates > -- > they want to see some kind of "score" or a graph. They are used to web > based polls where you can see a nice little graph, showing how many voted > for which candidate. Knowing whether an election was neck-and-neck or a > landslide is relevant information people should be able to see, I think. > > I have tried showing various things: for instance, I can show a Borda > count score. But of course the Borda score does not always correllate > with > the Condorcet outcome: you could have a higher score for a lower placed > candidate, and that will confuse people. > > Another thing I tried was showing a score which is the sum of all margins > by which they beat (or lost to) every other candidate. For instance, if > 20 > voters placed B above A, and 10 placed A above B, that would add 10 to B's > > score and subtract 10 from A's score. Again, though, it may not correllate > > with the Condorcet ranking, although for some reason my feeling is that > this type of score is "better" than a Borda count. (is there a name for > such a way of scoring?) > > So has anyone tried showing bar graphs or numerical scores for Condorcet > elections? I suspect that if this is completely impossible to show > something reasonable, I won't have much luck selling a condorcet based > system to a mainstream web audience....people really seem to want to see > something to help them understand the results. On the other hand, my gut > feeling is that there MUST be some way to have Condorcet results equate to > > numerical values. > > Any thoughts? > > -rob > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info