>
>
> Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
>
>> There's also something to be said for not over-optimizing for the
>> corner cases. At least in the vast majority of precincts in the U.S.,
>> active coercion is quite rare. We should design to avoid the most
>> common problems, as long as there was some way to address the edge
>> cases with more effort.
>
BUT, if coercion is made possible, there are those that will do it.
>
> Belgium is not a country where we think the government or a specific
> party will try to modify the election result to get more power or stay
> for ever in power. At least not here and now.
>
> However if electronic voting become common place, in many years, no-one
> will care to verify or distrust the system. And at that time, maybe the
> less democratic party of all will be in power and try to stay there by
> all mean.
>
> Also there is another risk. If Cuba start doing electronic election
> taking Belgium or the US as an example and mimic it. Then we (democratic
> country) will have no way to say that the system Cuba use is not democratic.
This is a BIG reason for WANTING US products to be good - smaller countries cannot afford to do their own thing.
>
> Actually Belgium frequently send observer all arround the world (in
> country where the democracy is weak) in order to verify if everything
> goes well. But WHO ARE WE to judge the level of democratic election in
> other country where in our own country it is not possible to recount and
> only few the happy few expert or worker from the vendor of the e-voting
> system could control the election result.
>
>> Of course, in other countries I imagine it would be quite different.
>> But I think the more important question is whether we can reach
>> consensus about -what- information should be available to -whom-.
>
>
> My vote should only be known by me (that is the principle of a secret).
> I don't even trust the computer in front of me. ;-) (many ATM machine
> have a "web"-cam for security reason. How long until voting machine have
> one?
Voting machines have different needs than ATMs - might verify more carefully who gets to be a voter, but not proper to peek in on how they vote.
>
> Then my vote exactly as I made it should be available (mixed and shaked
> with other) to the counting team... counted with whitness from each
> party. Then after the count, keeped securely for potential recount.
>
> I think that before any electronic system get introduced, you need to
> carefull set the goal and define what democratic election are.
>
> My definition is:
> 1) The vote should be secret.
Agreed.
> 2) The election result should be under citizen control (not expert
> control) [Where expert are the computer scientist for the state or from
> the vendor or ...]
>
> If a system exclude 99.9% of the population that must trust the other
> 0.1% able or capable to understand the system, then we have a problem.
>
Agreed the understanding must be common; details of even good implementations go over most of our heads.
> I had the plan to present a list of computer scientist durring the
> election. Then if our list get absolute majority... who will trust the
> result of the election.
>
> > If we can agree on that social question, the technical problems
> should > be simple to resolve.
>
> Trust me it is NOT SIMPLE at all.
>
> Securing a system from the user might be easy.
> Securing a system from the creator/operator of it (and hacker) is way
> much more difficult.
> Making such a system transparent as election should be without
> compromising the secrecy of the vote make it even more difficult.
>
> David GLAUDE
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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